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Abstract
The shift from purely static server-side websites to rich web services in the modern World
Wide Web entailed so-called single page applications. These are JavaScript programs
that run mostly server independent in the client’s browser and dynamically change the
visible elements, requesting additional resources only when they are needed. Unfortunately,
security issues were only of secondary importance in this evolution, leading to numerous
client-side attacks nowadays to steal sensitive user data such as credit card data or even
passwords. In addition to well-known cross-channel attacks such as cross-site scripting or
cross-side request forgery, this also includes resource tampering, which was originally more
ascribed to server-side attacks, but which explicitly enables client-side attacks through
the distribution of script resources by third party content distribution networks. While
existing work deals basically only with attacks by malicious third parties, we assume in
this thesis that the publisher of the application can be in cahoots with the adversary. The
resulting attack, targeting a specific or small group of clients, is called a resource alteration
attack, as the application files can be legitimately modified to reveal user information.
In this work, we present a novel approach based on a public key infrastructure to
prevent such attacks, even if multiple parties within our system have been compromised.
Hash values of application resources are embedded in certificates, which are validated
by certificate authorities. Thereafter, they are stored on one or more synchronizing log
servers in an authenticated data structure, the Merkle Tree [33]. Such a tree is able to
generate unforgeable proofs regarding its content and consistency of insertions, whereby
the existence of a certificate can be proven beyond doubt and verified by the client. We
modify and extend an existing protocol [34] that allows certificate authorities to monitor
modification and query processes, signing the proof responses on approval. This allows any
malicious party to be identified and held accountable in the event of inconsistencies. We
also present an efficient monitoring procedure that does not require a Merkle Tree to be
built and maintained locally, so that instead of only dedicated monitors, the client can
also ensure global consistency of multiple log servers. An analysis of our proposal shows
that the level of security scales in the number of certificate authorities involved, and in the
case of a secure connection between publisher and client, both the former and at least one
log server must be compromised in addition to the authorities for a successful attack.
Furthermore, we encourage security experts to publish their analysis results for an
application in our system with a certificate as well. Since we expect casual users to have
not taken far-reaching security precautions against common client-side attacks, experts can
additionally specify assertions in the analysis certificates to provide additional protection
and confidence. These are then verified by our browser extension, which already queries
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1 Client-Side Security in Single Page
Applications
The modern World Wide Web has come a long way: while static websites dominated in
its early days, server-side programming languages such as PHP led to a shift towards
interactive server-side applications. At the latest since the birth of Web 2.0 in 2003,
more and more parts of the application logic have shifted to the client side – supported
by JavaScript, which is still the prevailing programming language for client side web
applications today.
Since its peak in 2009 with 98.3%, the percentage of websites available via the Internet
Archive’s Wayback Machine that use JavaScript has not changed significantly [1]. However,
in addition to the complexity and number of statements, the number of third-party scripts
from remote origins involved has increased: in 2016, each site used external scripts from
an average of 12 different domains [1]. Besides analytics or advertising libraries, a common
representative is jQuery [2], whose presence grew after its introduction in 2006 to over 65%
in 2011 and which was used by 77.9% of the top 1 million websites at the end of 2018 [3]:
This provides, among other things, functionality for page navigation, asynchronous HTTP
requests and direct manipulation of the Document Object Model (DOM) tree – and may
therefore be considered one of the reasons for the rise of so-called Single Page Applications
(SPA).
Rather than downloading entirely new pages from the server after a user interaction
or navigation command, they dynamically update the content of the current page, while
additional resources are reloaded and embedded into the page only when needed [4]. This
allows a fluid and fast transition between different pages and views. Furthermore, they also
enable richer applications on the client side by moving traditional desktop functionality
to the browser, since resources as well as a complex application state can be effectively
cached locally. This implies at least limited offline functionality and the opportunity to
reuse backend code for mobile applications. Therefore concerns and corporations such
as Google, Facebook and Twitter have realized their products as SPAs, but also smaller
companies chose this design pattern for complex applications. To implement these, they
can draw on powerful frameworks such as React, AngularJS or Vue.js [5].
However, SPAs also have some drawbacks compared to conventional Multi Page Ap-
plications (MPA) [4], [5]: besides the more difficult optimization for search engines and
analytics, their initial loading takes much longer due to the resources that have to be
downloaded to start the application. Although subsequent page loads are usually faster
than MPAs, implementation bugs can cause a drop in performance. Even worse, their
strong dependence on the uncompiled programming language JavaScript (which therefore
cannot be deactivated in the browser, insofar as the application should be executable)
opens the door to attackers. But it is not JavaScript alone that has led to new web-specific
vulnerabilities. These have mainly arisen from the fact that security issues have been
grossly neglected during the evolution of the web, which is why some experts call “Web
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security” an oxymoron [1].
While there is an overwhelming amount of attacks on web applications in general and
on SPAs in particular, we would like to focus on those that aim at unauthorized access to
sensitive user data. Banking transactions are carried out online, private files and company
secrets are stored in the cloud, correspondence is increasingly based on e-mails or chats
– especially the fact that more and more critical services are being moved to the web
provides tempting incentives for attackers: credit card numbers, company secrets, private
addresses or simply passwords to access and exploit services without any further effort
offer a lucrative prospect. Therefore, a detailed investigation of such attacks and the
development of effective security countermeasures are necessary.
1.1 Client-Side Attacks and Mitigation Techniques
In general, attacks on web applications can be categorized as server-side or client-side.
While the former aim at gaining access to the server and thus the backend of the application,
the latter intend to control or manipulate the JavaScript code in the user’s browser. Of
course, both can be used to steal user data. But since attacks on the server have been
dealt with extensively in literature [6], [7], we limit ourselves to only consider client-side
attacks that lead to violation of privacy and confidentiality.
Cross-Channel Attacks One of the most common and serious client-side attacks is
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [8]: Due to insufficient or incorrect validation of user input,
an attacker can force the execution of malicious scripts injected into a web application
through user input forms. It is usually separated into three categories: Reflected, Stored
and DOM-based XSS. The first two target the server, which executes the malicious code
either transiently or persistently and reveals information, while the latter refers to the
execution in the client’s browser by DOM manipulation. This may result in cookie stealing
to impersonate the user to the server by hijacking the session, in phishing of credentials via
manipulated DOM input fields or even key logging, or in the exposure of private information
displayed on the website [9], [10]. Note that it is also possible to execute JavaScript code
received from other sources during runtime by commands such as eval without involving
the DOM, which can therefore be considered a fourth category of Client-Side XSS [11].
Cross-Site Scripting attacks have already been known for nearly 20 years [1], and due to
their importance there are a number of proposals for detection and prevention. In general,
they use techniques such as static and dynamic analysis, modeling, policies or programming
guidelines – however, this is a widely explored research area, and therefore we just refer to
[10] for a detailed overview.
Another attack that targets the user, but has received less attention in the literature than
XSS, is Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [12]: a malicious website forces the browser
to send HTTP requests in the name of the user – if they are already authenticated on a
website, arbitrary actions such as transactions can be performed and information available
in the account can be accessed. In contrast to XSS, the malicious code runs on third-party
sites, which means that CSRF attacks are not dependent on JavaScript. This implies that
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sites which are vulnerable to XSS automatically allow CSRF – however, even effective
protection against XSS is no guarantee of being immune to CSRF [13]. Nevertheless,
such attacks usually exploit poorly secured authentication mechanisms, such as Basic
Authentication [14] or session cookies, which is why simple means such as secret tokens or
development guidelines can often provide a remedy [12], [13]. More sophisticated solutions
use, for example, an HTTP proxy on the client side to examine outgoing requests [15], or
a browser extension to prohibit non-compliant messages [13].
We end the overview of cross-channel scripting attacks with Cross Frame Scripting (XFS)
[16]: If the user has been tricked onto a malicious website, an attacker can integrate the
actual web application using an HTML iframe element – by listening to events leaked by
the browser, for example, key logging is possible. Furthermore, such attacks may enable
XSS or CSRF, but must be clearly distinguished from them. In contrast to CSRF, the
attack is executed inside the visited website, but does not force a script execution as during
XSS attacks. Rather, XFS can be compared to phishing or spoofing schemes, but it does
not install a vulnerability in the copied target web site, it exploits one of the browser.
Developers can easily prevent such attacks through Frame Busting, i.e. prohibiting the
inclusion of their website in a frame [17].
Resource Tampering Although there are more client-side attacks like web cache poi-
soning or response splitting and associated mitigation techniques [18], we would just like
to introduce another attack traditionally considered to be server-side: Defacement [19]
refers to the malicious modification of page content by an intruder, i.e. the insertion of
provocative or offensive data. To ensure the integrity of website resources, watermarks
have been suggested [20], [21]. Based on message authentication methods or simple hash
algorithms, watermarks related to the page content are generated and embedded in the
website through upper- and lowercase letters of HTML tags. Their locations are determined
by secret keys, which in turn serve to extract a watermark from a page – if this does not
correspond to the originally generated one, the attack is discovered. Other suggestions
achieve this by periodically matching a checksum of the website with an already stored one
[19], [22], which can also be handled by a browser extension on client-side, or by log file
analysis [23]. As an alternative approach, [24] makes use of genetic programming: Using
observations of the target page and a sample set of attacks during its learning phase, the
generated algorithm does not rely on domain-specific knowledge, but is still able to detect
suspicious modifications and raise alarms.
The reason we mention this classic server intrusion attack pattern is the trend towards rich
applications whose script resources are retrieved from multiple origins other than the server.
By defacing them, an attacker can bypass the mentioned security mechanisms against
cross-channel attacks, since a properly integrated but maliciously modified application
script is not cross-channel despite having the same effect on client-side. This means
that the attacker can “legitimately” access user information, as this seems to be part of
the application – making cross-channel attacks obsolete. Since such an attack is not a
classic defacement, we will use the term Tampering for altering resources of arbitrary
type in the following. The mentioned defacement mitigation techniques have only limited
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effect in this case, since they are either designed for purely static content located on the
application server, or are based on previous observations, which can be compromised from
the beginning. Therefore, various approaches to mitigate tampering attacks by malicious
Content Distribution Networks (CDN) or third parties in general have been proposed:
In [25], mutation events are used to enforce security policies before scripts are executed.
The policies specified by the application publisher can, for example, restrict script access
or only allow scripts white-listed by their hash value. Firecoral [26] provides a browser
extension that allows the client to participate in a peer-to-peer CDN to share resources
with other clients and thereby validate them. A trusted signing component validates the
authenticity of the resource checksum a client claims to have received from the server. The
signed checksum is then deposited with the peer discovery component so that other clients
can subsequently request the same resource from the client. Stickler [27], on the other hand,
does not require an extension, but uses a bootloader script embedded in the HTML page
of the application. This contains functionality to load the required application resources
and verify if their checksums match those stored in a separate manifest file. Alternatively,
the verification can only check whether the resources have been signed by the publisher.
The development platform Mylar [28] protects data from attackers with full access to
the servers involved by encrypting it on client-side. The developers of an application can
determine which data can be encrypted and who can access it. Further, Mylar ensures
their integrity through a browser extension that verifies checksums of resources. Finally,
Subresource Integrity [29] allows the publisher to specify checksums of a resource in the
HTML page of the application, which is verified when loaded by the browser. Furthermore,
the check can be enforced by specifying an appropriate policy. Although this feature is
already available in most browsers, its status is still “recommendation” [30].
Unfortunately, all these proposals assume that the publisher’s server is not compromised
or at least the developers are not malicious. Only the peer-to-peer solution Firecoral could
continue to ensure integrity in this scenario – but demands that other trusted parties the
client relies on can never be compromised by an attacker.
1.2 Adversary Model
As it already became clear at the end of the last section, we assume in this work that
there is a powerful adversary who attacks the client by manipulating the resources of a
single page application. However, they are not only able to infiltrate CDNs, but also to
compromise or even convince the publisher of the application to cooperate with them.
Strictly speaking, it follows that it is no longer a tampering attack, since the application
owner is providing a new version that is vulnerable – so we call this attack a Resource
Alteration Attack instead. In summary, the adversary has full control over:
• the application server and the resources on it
• CDNs that provide additional resources for the website
• the uncompressed source code and the build process
• the network connection and communication
• an arbitrary number of members that could be relevant for security systems
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The first two points allow all resources to be modified at will, no matter where they
are stored. The third point allows these changes to be legitimately made, i.e. without
inconsistencies in checksums or log files. In addition, the attacker is able to monitor
arbitrary connections, read messages, modify them and, if necessary, repeat or insert them.
But the last point has the greatest influence: We allow the adversary to control not only
servers that are involved in the delivery of the application, but also those network members
that are supposed to ensure integrity and thus protection against resource alteration. Note
that these do not necessarily have to be objects: The adversary can also convince developers
and organizations to participate in the attack. However, we demand that the attacker can
neither control the user nor the computer and browser they use, and thus still assume the
necessity of web-based attacks.
Scenario We assume in this thesis that the adversary does not attack all users of an
application at the same time – if they did, there would be no way to expose resource
manipulation as a malicious action. Instead, it would have to be interpreted as a simple
software update, except that the new version has vulnerabilities. Depending on the type,
these can be detected by the mitigation techniques described above or by security experts
or tools that analyze the application using a wide variety of methods [31], [32]. Therefore,
we expect the resource alteration attack to target a specific or a small group of users, and
only they will receive the malicious version of the single page application.
Furthermore, we need to make restrictions in order to have any chance at all against the
adversary. Otherwise, in the worst case, they would be able to compromise the whole web,
if all members could contribute to our protection. Note that we are explicitly talking about
network members rather than just servers, as other clients in decentralized or distributed
systems can also be in cahoots with the attacker. For this reason, we limit the attacker so
that they can control some, but not all of the members – however, we do not determine
their exact type and number.
Finally, we demand that all application resources required for execution in the browser
are static files that are not generated specifically for a client upon request. This makes the
website itself explicitly not static – during runtime, its content can still change and contain
client-specific information dynamically queried from the server. However, it excludes
techniques such as server-side rendering, where the page is loaded with the necessary
information on the server before delivery. But since this requires that the application
server, and thus the adversary, already has access to sensitive user data, purely static
resources do not represent a significant restriction.
We want to emphasize that all proposals against tampering from the previous section
fail in this scenario: Policies can’t work with reasonably sophisticated and intentional
vulnerabilities without significantly restricting the functionality of other, honest websites.
Subresource Integrity and Stickler only protect against third parties, not against the
publisher who provides the necessary checksums. In Mylar, developers determine what
information is encrypted, which checksums are used for integrity verification, and who
has access to data – but they can easily be convinced to support the attack based on our
5
1 Client-Side Security in Single Page Applications
adversary model. Even Firecoral falls victim to the power of the adversary: once the peer
discovery service and the publisher are in cahoots, they can provide the client and the
signing component with tampered resources. These obviously cannot be obtained from any
other client and are henceforth considered valid new resources. Since the Peer Discovery
component keeps the client’s message about the new resource visible only to the client and
the signing component, the attack is not noticeable.
1.3 Contribution
In this master’s thesis we present a new scalable approach to prevent targeted resource
alteration attacks even in case of multiple compromised entities within our system. For this
purpose, we enable the publisher of a security-critical single page application to wrap hash
values of resources that serve as fingerprints into certificates and register them in a public
key infrastructure. This consists of log servers, which store the certificates in authenticated
data structures, the Merkle Trees [33], and thus can generate unforgeable proofs about
the existence of a certificate as well as consistency between several versions of the tree.
These are then verified by certificate authorities who supervise the registration process and
forwarded to both the publisher and the client. After registration, the certificate is publicly
visible and cannot be removed from the data structure, preventing hidden attacks on a
client. In addition, security experts can publish analysis results in the same way, informing
casual users of any vulnerabilities in websites, whether or not they have been tampered
with. In detail, the most notable features of our system are:
Multi-Resistant Integrity Protection Collision-resistant hash values, which are
stored in certificates that are made publicly visible, are used to prove the integrity of
resources beyond any doubt. We modify and extend protocols of an existing public key
infrastructure [34], which ensure that all parties involved monitor each other during both
registration and query, so that the client can request verifiable proofs for existing certificates.
Moreover, efficient consistency checks can be performed by both the client and dedicated
monitors. A security analysis shows that a scalable number of certificate authorities (all
those involved in the process) must be compromised in order to deliver a bogus certificate
to the client. If the connection between application server and client is secure and the log
servers are immune to Denial of Service attacks, the publisher and all participating log
servers must also be malicious.
Authenticity and Accountability Public key cryptography and digital signatures
make it possible to ensure authenticity of a certificate and each action of every participant.
Since with every modification of stored certificates the actions themselves, but also the
approval by supervising parties must be authenticated by signature, the malicious entities
can be identified and held accountable in case of inconsistencies (which most likely indicate
an attack). These in turn become visible at the latest through the append-only property
of the Merkle Tree logs, which can be verified by all parties.
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Distribution of Security Analysis Results Although our system guarantees that all
users receive the same application resources, it provides no information about vulnerabilities
to traditional client-side attacks in those resources. But since we do not assume that
casual users will review the resources or even use analysis tools to identify threats, we offer
security analysts a way to register the results of their analysis and optionally resulting
assertions for an application by using special certificates – these can then be dynamically
verified by the client. Because they follow the same processes as the resource certificates,
they cannot be inserted or modified unnoticed.
Efficient Verification and Deployability We implemented a lightweight browser
extension for the client that automatically downloads certificates and verifies the associated
proofs and assertions. Since due to the use of Merkle Trees, the former require only
hash calculations to be verified and their length remains logarithmic in the number of all
registered certificates, they do not neither require high computational effort nor notable
network consumption. For the other participants we provide virtualized containers, which
offer the functionality intended for them – especially for developers it is thus possible to
integrate our system into their existing deployment process without much configuration
effort by just a single line.
1.4 Outline
We start with an introduction to the concept of public key infrastructures in Chapter
2: after a brief explanation of basic cryptographic concepts on which they are based in
Section 2.1, we examine the different categories and corresponding proposals in Section 2.2.
It turns out that neither authority- nor client-centric architectures would be particularly
suitable for our scenario, but domain-centric concepts based on log servers are. Therefore,
we compare the different approaches in this category with respect to several features,
including security, at the end of this section.
Since most log-based public key infrastructures make use of the authenticated data
structure Merkle Tree, we introduce it in Section 2.3: Following on from basic terminology,
we show how it allows to prove that an entry is actually in the tree. Furthermore, two
different variants of Merkle Trees are presented, each with its own proof capabilities, which
together form the data structure that we build on later. Finally, we look at applications of
this data structure in the literature and productive systems.
Subsequently, we start with the description of our system in Chapter 3 by explaining
the basic design decisions and defining the requirements for our infrastructure in Section
3.1. We not only consider the necessary security criteria, but also quality attributes that
have to be met on order to gain acceptance by users and developers. From now on, we
focus on the different participants in Section 3.2 and the individual data structures, i.e.
the different certificates and their attributes, in Section 3.3. The interaction between
participants as well as the creation and usage of certificates is defined by the protocol in
Section 3.4: we begin by describing the modifications to the public key infrastructure that
inspired it, followed by the protocol steps of generating certificates, modifying Merkle Trees,
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and verifying resources and proofs. Afterwards, an extension of the original protocol is
presented, that is monitoring without keeping a copy of the data structure. The subsequent
security analysis in Section 3.5, in which we consider both external and internal attacks,
as well as combinations thereof, reveals the resilience of our architecture. After briefly
discussing the implementation of the prototype in Section 3.6, we conclude the chapter
with a discussion of, for example, improvements or economic incentives in Section 3.7.
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Architectures
A public key infrastructure (PKI) [35] describes several roles, policies and services, which
allow users to securely exchange private data inside an insecure public network like the
Internet. Every participant owns a digital certificate for identification, which can be obtained
through a trusted certificate authority (CA). An additional registration authority (RA)
ensures validity and correctness of a registration request and authenticates the requesting
entity. Afterwards, a generated certificate is stored in one or more secure directories and
made publicly available to other parties through a certificate management system. The
certificate itself contains a unique key used for authentication and encryption based on
public key cryptography: Every participant owns a cryptographic key pair consisting of a
secret private key only they know and the public key included in the certificate. If this pair
satisfies the property that a message encrypted with one of them (which we call cipher) can
only be decrypted by the other, it can be used for secure communication – by encrypting
a message with the public key of the recipient, a receiver cannot decrypt it unless they
have the corresponding private key. Further, it allows to create digital signatures for a
message by encrypting it with the private key and sending the resulting cipher (or, more
precisely, the signature) together with the original message. Then, anyone can authenticate
the sender by decrypting its signature with the corresponding public key obtained through
the certificate and comparing the result with the message. A formal description is given in
section 2.1, but for now, this explanation suffices to illustrate five fundamental security
requirements a PKI satisfies:
• Non-Repudiation: Since a PKI requires each message to be digitally signed, the
sender can neither deny the existence nor the origin of a message.
• Privacy: A PKI enables private communication based on public key encryption – any
party that is not an intended receiver cannot decrypt and read a message.
• Integrity: Besides its importance for non-repudiation, a digital signature proves that
the message has not been tampered with if it is equal to the message when decrypted.
• Accountability: A participant can be held accountable for their messages, as their
identity can be verified through digital signatures in combination with certificates.
• Trust: A PKI creates trust between all parties involved based on the security
properties above – however, each participant has to trust the issuing CA.
Regarding secure web-applications, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) ecosystem pro-
tects the majority of financial and commercial transactions [34] as well as the communication
between web server and client as part of the HTTPS protocol [36]. It employs a PKI for
X.509 certificates (PKIX) [37], the standardized format for a TLS certificate, using a repos-
itory for valid certificates and one for certificate revocation lists (CRL). The architecture
is illustrated by Figure 2.1: Whenever a domain owner wants a X.509 certificate to be
approved, they contact a CA either directly or through a RA. On approval, the CA signs
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this certificate and publishes it on the repository (the latter may alternatively be performed
by a RA). This workflow also applies to certificate revocation, except that a CA updates
the list of revoked certificates and publishes it on the CRL repository. To establish trust
between CAs, they build a hierarchical CA certificate chain using cross-certification (i.e.
signing the public key of another CA), which allows to verify signatures of any participating
CA by using the public key in the topmost certificate referred to as root certificate.
Figure 2.1: Entities and communication in the public key infrastructure for X.509 certificates [38].
When accessing a website or executing a transaction, the communication is encrypted
using the public key of the target server, which is included in its certificate. The CA
signature should prove the correctness of the public key and identity of its owner, and is
verified using a root certificate built into the browser (e.g., Mozilla Firefox has about 100
in its database [39]). Unfortunately, a single compromised authority can issue certificates
containing fake keys for any domain which are still accepted by the browser [40]–[44]. In
fact, this can result in Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, i.e. a third party can read and
possibly alter the communication while remaining undetected [45].
For this reason, numerous new architectures have been proposed to mitigate the impact of
untrustworthy authorities – they can be roughly classified as CA-, client- or domain-centric
[34], and we take a closer look at the notable work in section 2.2. Since it turns out that
domain-centric approaches using log servers are suited best for our purposes, section 2.3




Although cryptography has long been recognized as the art of writing or solving codes
(as defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 2006), modern cryptography is essentially
the science of techniques for securing digital information, distributed computations and
transactions [46]. Fortunately, this shift led to new methods accompanied by formal
definitions and security proofs, which are not only intended for encrypting messages. Since
PKIs security characteristics are based on cryptographic operations, this section briefly
introduces their fundamental building blocks.
2.1.1 Hash Functions
A basic method for ensuring integrity in networks and especially for digital signatures are
hash functions. Informally, they compress an (possibly infinite) input string into a string
of fixed length which can effectively serve as a fingerprint for the input.
Consider two alphabets M and D. A hash function H : M∗ → Dk compresses a
message m ∈M∗ of arbitrary length into a digest d ∈ Dk of fixed size k deterministically
and in polynomial time. Members of M∗ are also commonly called preimages, while a
member of Dk is named hash value or simply hash. Since Dk is finite but M∗ isn’t, H
cannot be injective and applying H to two different m,m′ ∈M∗ may result in a collision
H(m) = H(m′). Thus, in context of cryptography, the following security requirements are
commonly considered [46]:
1. Preimage resistance: Given a digest d ∈ Dk, the probability of “guessing” a value
m ∈M∗ such that m = H−1(d) is negligible for every probabilistic polynomial-time
inverting algorithm (which we will further denote as computationally hard [47] to
find)
2. Second preimage resistance: Given a fixed m ∈ M∗, it is computationally hard to
find m′ ∈M∗ such that m 6= m′ and H(m′) = H(m)
3. Collision Resistance: It is computationally hard to find any distinct m,m′ ∈ M∗
such that H(m) = H(m′)
Note that collision-resistance implies second preimage resistance, and we obviously want
to use a collision-resistant hash function in our system. Ideally, it behaves like a random
oracle [48]: on the same input, the output is repeated, but for any new message a random
string is returned (which implies that even a small change in the message is likely to result
in an entirely different digest). Of course, such an oracle does not exist – yet, hash functions
should not be distinguishable from it. However, popular representatives like SHA-256
suffer from a vulnerability called length-extension attack [49], which can be exploited if an
attacker knows the length of a message m and its digest H(m): Due to their construction,
an attacker can choose a message m′ depending on the length of m and compute H(m||m′)
without knowledge of m, where || denotes the concatenation operation. Therefore, hash
functions vulnerable to length extension are clearly distinguishable from a random oracle,
even though this has no impact on their resistance.
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2.1.2 Digital Signatures
As described above, a digital signature [50] guarantees integrity, authenticity and non-
repudiation of a message [51]. Based on public key cryptography, it uses a secret private key
and a public key accessible to the recipient, who is therefore able to verify the mentioned
characteristics of the signature. In general, it is described by a mathematical scheme given
by three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Sign, Verify) which satisfy the
following [46]:
1. Gen generates two keys pk and sk (the public and private key, respectively) for a
security parameter λn
2. Given a message m and a private key sk, Sign returns a signature σ
3. The deterministic algorithm Verify computes a bit Valid or Invalid using a public
key pk, a message m and a signature σ
As an example, consider a signature scheme based on RSA [52]: GenRSA returns a
figure N = p · q with p, q prime as well as two integers e, d with ed = 1 mod φ(N). Then,
the private key is 〈N , d〉 and the public key is 〈N , e〉. Using such a private key and a
message m ∈ Z∗N , SignRSA computes σ := md mod N . Finally, VerifyRSA returns Valid
if and only if m ?= σe mod N for a public key 〈N , e〉, a signature s and a message m with
σ,m ∈ Z∗N .
However, this signature scheme is insecure: Given two messages m1,m2 ∈ Z∗N , and
corresponding signatures σ1,σ2, then σ := σ1 · σ2 is a valid signature for m = m1 ·m2
because σe = (σ1 · σ2)e = (md1 ·md2)e = med1 ·med2 = m1 ·m2 = m mod N . Thus, an
adversary can create a forgery, i.e. a valid signature for the message m although they do
not know the private key 〈N , d〉. Therefore, we demand that a secure digital signature
is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack [46]: It has to be
computationally hard to find a valid signature without knowledge of the private key even
if the attacker can obtain valid signatures for an arbitrary number of messages of their
choice. In case of RSA, this can easily be achieved: Sign typically hashes a message m
with an at least preimage resistant hash function H before computing the signature. This
ensures that it cannot be forged due to the multiplicity of RSA, since H(m1 ·m2) and
H(m1) ·H(m2) are totally different digests. Moreover, H(m) is of fixed size and usually
much shorter than the arbitrary large message m, which is why most signature schemes
sign the hash value instead of the plain message as this also results in a speed benefit.
In the following, we denote the encryption of a message m with a public key K by {m}K ,
whereas a message signed with a private key K−1 (i.e. m together with its signature) is
written as {m}K−1 .
2.2 Enhanced PKI Architectures
While public key infrastructure architectures have been developed for various fields [53]–[57],
we focus on proposals designed specifically for X.509 certificates [37], the standardized
format for TLS. Due to the enormous impact of the weaknesses of PKIX, the work in this
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area covers almost all relevant concepts regarding PKIs. As stated in [34], the proposed
architectures can be divided into three categories: In CA-centric PKIs, authorities control
whether a certificate is valid or not. By contrast, client-centric approaches enable clients to
actively select and maintain mechanisms for certificate validation by themselves. Domain-
centric architectures share the permission to define which certificates are valid between
CA and domain owner, thereby allowing the latter to actively control (and protect) their
































Figure 2.2: Classification of enhanced PKI architectures.
2.2.1 CA-Centric Architectures
We have already encountered a CA-centric enhancement: the CRLs in PKIX extend the
standard PKI model by providing an authority-managed source for looking up revocations.
Unfortunately, clients have to download them continuously to make sure that a certificate
is not revoked – as CRLs can get quite large, this is highly impractical during connection
setup.
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [58] is designed to resolve these issues.
This standard requires CAs to run external OCSP servers which are always up-to-date with
the certificate repository of the CA. Therefore, clients are not required to download CRLs
but can query these servers for a particular certificate. Although some successive extensions
[59], [60] have been proposed to allow secure status checks in real-time, implementations
still suffer from performance and security flaws [61].
By restricting the time-to-live of a certificate to several hours up to a few days, short-lived
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certificates (SLC) [62] eliminate the need for revocation and therefore make CRLs as well
as OCSP obsolete. However, this results in quite a long attack window if a fake certificate
is accepted.
In conclusion, SLC and other CA-centric architectures do explicitly not protect against
certificates issued by a compromised CA, making this category unsuitable for our scenario,
as a single party can always be compromised by the adversary.
2.2.2 Client-Centric Architectures
A naive approach to client empowerment is to let the client simply define what trust means
to them. Thus, the Policy Engine [63] offers support in designing custom security policies
(e.g. “certificate keys shorter than n bits are untrustworthy”), which can also include
historical observations. The engine transforms these rules into predicate functions for
certificate validation.
However, this system is purely local – in contrast, systems like Perspectives [64] and
Convergence [65] use public repositories called notaries which connect to the service a
client queries and log the certificate it offers. Based on a policy selected by the client, a
particular voting rule is applied between several notaries to validate the result. To detect
malicious participants, the notaries share their databases among themselves and sign them
in case of consistency, so that a client can cross-validate the reply.
The largest repository was created by the Electronic Frontier Foundation: They collected
all X.509 certificates visible on the Internet (IPv4) and stored them in the SSL Observatory
[66] for research purposes. Unfortunately, the data is not updated and cannot be queried
online.
Finally, Perspectives and Convergence are powerful architectures against attacks even if
a large proportion of notaries is compromised (and are, in fact, relatively similar to some
proposals in the next section). Yet, we would like to demand even more: Consider a MitM
attack on the service itself, such that the attacker behaves as a proxy for incoming requests.
To both clients and notaries, the attacker could present a consistent view regarding their
fake certificate, and the only party that would be able to detect the attack (i.e. the
publisher) is not involved in the voting process. This motivates our investigation in the
following category.
2.2.3 Domain-Centric Architectures
PKIs in this area are designed to reduce the inevitability of blindly trusting authorities
by taking statements of the owner into account. They can be subdivided into approaches
based on pinning, DNS, blockchains and log servers.
Pinning Representatives of pinning-based proposals are Public Key Pinning (PKP) [67]
and Trust Assertions for Certificate Keys (TACK) [68]. The former allows servers to attach
several X.509 certificate chains to a response which the client “pins” on first service access
for a limited period. Alternatively, the latter defines designated TACK-keys which are
processed in the same way. If on a subsequent request, a certificate occurs that is not
14
2.2 Enhanced PKI Architectures
included in the pinned list for this service or, respectively, a TACK-key that is not equal to
the pin, the client might be under attack. However, these systems do not protect on first
access and also decline acceptance of legitimately changed certificates until the pin expires.
DNS DNS Certificate Authority Authentication (CAA) [69] allows service providers to
specify which CAs should issue their certificates inside resource records served by the
Domain Name System. Before accepting a certificate, the CA performs a lookup for the
corresponding record and ensures that it is included therein. Correct behavior of the
authority can be monitored by third parties (or, although not recommended, directly by
clients).
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [70] enables domain owners to
specify constraints on the acceptance of certificates in DNS records. These and advise
clients to allow only a particular root-authority, to accept the certificate if already a given
segment of the CA certificate chain is valid, or to match against a particular certificate.
Note that the last option enables the use self-signed certificates by skipping cross-validation.
Unfortunately, both rely on uncompromisable DNS servers which therefore become a single
point of failure.
Blockchain The core idea behind blockchain-based PKIs is to decentralize the certificate
repository, so that consensus about the validity of a certificate must be reached between the
parties involved in the registration process. In general, a blockchain [71] is a list of records
called blocks that contain transactions (i.e. an actual data value) stored in a hash-based
data structure which serves as digital signature over the dataset. Besides some other values,
the block header contains this signature and a hash value of the previous block that marks
the current one as its successor. Both signatures together allow to verify that a blockchain
includes a particular value and each block is an extension of its tail. Since each node in
a blockchain network is considered untrustworthy, several approaches exist in order to
reaching consensus – for example, Proof-of-Work (PoW) requires each node to compute
hash values of the block header using a varying nonce value (i.e. a number only used once)
as additional header attribute. If a digest fulfills predefined requirements, the other nodes
verify its correctness and append the new block to their local blockchains. The computing
node gets a reward for being the first to find a proper hash.
The decentralized PKIs DNSChain [72] and Certcoin make use of the cryptocurrency
Namecoin [73] which primarily acts as decentralized DNS but supports X.509 certificates
to be additionally included. However, DNSChain introduces central servers to remove the
need for clients to download the whole blockchain in order to verify a transaction, which in
turn leads to attacks if these servers are compromised. Certcoin has no identity validation,
which implies that an attacker can easily register certificates for a domain they do not own.
Other approaches like IKP [74] or the PKI developed by Pomcor [75] rely on CAs
responsible for the prevention of identity theft as well as for certificate registration and
monitors to validate their publications to the blockchain. Further, IKP combines this with
authorization criteria embedded in policies a publisher defines and reactions specified by
the CA which apply if a unauthorized certificate is issued. Both of them require the client
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to download only the chain of block headers without the actual block data, making the
verification process more efficient.
Nevertheless, all proposals suffer from problems typical for blockchains [76], [77]: First of
all, most blockchains do not scale very well. Since the block size is fixed by design, it can
only contain a limited number of transactions – therefore, only so many can be processed
at once. Secondly, performance issues arise especially from the consensus mechanism, as
all nodes have to verify and update their blockchains which may take hours to complete.
Finally, blockchains are based on the assumption that an attacker cannot gain control over
at least 51% of the nodes responsible for hashing. Otherwise, they would have conquered
the whole network and be able to reverse and suppress transactions from other participants.
Log Server Instead of decentralized repositories, several architectures let domain owners
register their certificates on public log servers to make CAs accountable for their actions.
Soverein Key (SK) [78] requires any X.509 certificate to be cross-signed by an additional
public key which is registered on append-only “timeline” servers for the respective domain.
Usually, a client queries a mirror server that keeps a full copy of the timelines for the
sovereign key of a domain, and declines any certificate that is not signed by it – however,
this is based on trust, since a compromised mirror could simply answer with a fake key
that does not exist in the timeline.
In contrast, Certificate Transparency (CT) [79] uses an authenticated data structure as
chronological append-only log which is capable of creating cryptographic proofs regarding
the inclusion of its content. Clients can then easily verify that a particular certificate
is indeed included and the current log is an extension of another one observed earlier
(typically, the latter is checked by dedicated monitor servers).
Yet, CT does not allow to prove that a certificate has been revoked, which is why
the Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI) [80] relies on a verifiable data structure called
LexTree that is ordered lexicographically rather than chronologically. Certificates for a
domain can be directly accessed in such a key-value store and simply removed on revocation.
Unfortunately, consistency between two observed versions cannot be proven like in CT, as
this requires non-modification. Therefore, AKI establishes a “checks-and-balances” concept
between CAs, log servers and validators to make sure that all parties behave correctly by
monitoring and reporting each other.
Inspired by this, the Attack Resilient Public-Key Infrastructure (ARPKI) [34] addresses
weaknesses of AKI through extensive protocols for maintaining the log. Certificates are
registered or revoked by creating a new entry which is synchronized between log servers.
Further, a domain owner can actively select the service providers involved in the process,
which then verify and cross-sign their actions for accountability. Additionally, the security
property of ARPKI has been formally proven using the protocol verification tool Tamarin
Prover [81].
Built on top of ARPKI, PoliCert [82] adds separate certificate policies defined by
domain owners which contain configuration parameters for the PKI protocol and security
parameters for certificate validation. The selected CAs sign a bundle of these policies so
that they can be published to the LexTree along with TLS certificates. However, PoliCert
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relies heavily on auditor servers responsible for log monitoring, which are queried by clients
to approve the proof result.
Certificate Issuance and Revocation Transparency (CIRT) [83] combines an append-only
log like in CT with a LexTree to build a PKI specifically for end-to-end encryption in
messaging or email systems. While the LexTree contains certificates like in AKI, the log
includes an entry for each certificate together with a fingerprint of the LexTree at the time
of insertion, which enables participants to verify (non-)inclusion as well as consistency
between two versions of the log. Nevertheless, third-party auditors still have to ensure that
none of the data structures exclusively contains a value by keeping a full copy of both and
verifying each operation.
As an improvement, the Distributed Transparent Key Infrastructure (DTKI) [39] reuses
the idea of combining a chronological with a lexicographical data structure to provide the
same proofs as CIRT, but lets clients verify random parts of the log and “gossip” the results
among themselves for collective monitoring of the logs. Further, it employs two types of
log servers: multiple certificate log maintainers hold distinct subsets of the certificates,
whereas a single mapping log maintainer is responsible for associations between domains
and the logs containing the corresponding certificates. Since none of them needs to be
trusted, this partitioning prevents an oligopoly of a single participant. Like ARPKI, the
security property of DTKI has been formally proven.
In summary, domain-centric architectures serve as a useful basis for our system, as they
also allow domain owners to have a say in the verification process. However, pinning- and
DNS-based approaches have several shortcomings regarding security, like unprotected first
access or, even worse, reliance on a trusted party. Blockchains seem to be a good choice
regarding decentralization and the associated empowerment of clients. Yet, we would have
to balance serious performance limitations and fundamental security concerns depending on
the number of nodes. Therefore, we take a look at PKIs using log servers in the following
section, since they promise accountability and non-repudiation for claims of the CAs and
logs, as well as higher security in case of compromise.
2.2.4 Comparison
As observed above, domain-centric approaches based on log servers are the means of
choice in our scenario. However, a closer look reveals that this is only partially true:
some architectures have weaknesses that even make them worse than proposals from other
categories. Nevertheless, we identify some suitable candidates below based on several
characteristics summarized in table 2.1 by consulting analyses of multiple researchers [34],
[39], [84], [85].
Security With regard to security of the proposals, we consider the ability of a PKI to
mitigate a MitM attack. Since SK requires a certificate to be signed by a sovereign key,
a bogus certificate would not be accepted, unlike in CT, where any logged certificate is
considered valid (and remains in the log until it expires even on detection by the domain
owner). CIRT enables the revocation of mis-issued certificates and provides proofs for
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detecting them, but still fails in prevention like SK and CT, i.e. it cannot detect the
registration of such a certificate by a malicious CA. Instead, AKI, ARPKI and PoliCert
establish additional protocols for revoking a certificate and monitoring actions of CAs and
logs by other components while DTKI allows clients to verify the actions of any participant,
which makes them all robust in preventing MitM attacks.
This is also reflected by the number of participants that must be compromised in order
to carry out a successful attack. In SK, CT and CIRT it is enough to control a single log
server. The protocols in AKI and PoliCert ensure that the attacker has to compromise at
least a log and a validating service, since CAs are not actively involved in the verification
process. Only ARPKI requires that n servers behave maliciously to launch a successful
attack (where n is a scalable system parameter), which has also been formally proven.
Likewise, a formal proof for DTKI states that if the domain owner registered and verified
a so-called master certificate before the attack, all parties can be compromised and the
system would still be secure – however, in general, this constraint and also the assumption
that clients communicate via a (unspecified) gossip protocol may not be fulfilled, which is
why an attacker has to gain control over only one log server.
Further, neither CT nor CIRT support recovery if a domain owner loses their private
key and DTKI supposes that this (as well as key compromise) cannot happen, whereas all
the other architectures can handle key loss. From a client’s perspective, SK, CIRT and
DTKI do not preserve privacy, as they require the client to actively query a log server that
can learn about the visited domains. For the other approaches, proofs are handed over to
the domain owner who forwards them to the client. The other way round, a domain can
configure security policies like involved parties in AKI, ARPKI and, even more, additional
properties for the verification of a certificate in PoliCert.
Although being a desirable feature for enhancements of PKIX, we consider the support
for multiple certificates of a domain as a vulnerability regarding our use case, since this
undermines our method of determining integrity. Nevertheless, CT allows an arbitrary
number of certificates by design, SK and DTKI enable multi-certificate registration through
the sovereign and master key, respectively, and PoliCert binds multiple certificates to a
single subject certificate policy defined by the domain owner.
Proofs The mentioned proposals behave transparent, i.e. they make the stored informa-
tion publicly visible. Unless SK, the PKIs offer verifiable proofs that allow other parties to
verify correctness of an operation. Naturally, this can be the modification and consequential
presence or absence of a certificate. In case of append-only logs, they support proving that
the current database version is a consistent extension of an earlier one.
Since CT uses such an append-only log, it can provide efficient proofs for included
certificates as well as for consistency. However, proving that a domain is absent or querying
the most recent certificate for a particular domain would result in an exhaustive search
on all certificates contained within the log. Instead, the LexTree used in AKI, ARPKI
and PoliCert serves as a key-value store and allows removal of a certificate. This implies
that consistency proofs are impossible, but besides presence and absence, a query about
the currently unrevoked certificates can also be answered efficiently in a verifiable manner.
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Finally, the combination of these two data structures in CIRT and DTKI also results in a
union of the proof capabilities, since the LexTree reflects the validity of certificates and
the chronological log describes their evolution over time.
Deployability Finally, we emphasize some deployability concerns that are especially
important for a TLS infrastructure. Nevertheless, they could assist us in deciding which
approaches to take inspiration from.
In SK, CIRT, PoliCert and DTKI, the client is responsible for fetching the required
information (the key of the domain in SK, proofs in the others) directly from an involved
party, whereas CT, AKI and ARPKI provide their proofs to the domain owner who appends
them to the client request. Therefore, the former architectures depend on extra client
communication, which excludes offline verification.
Redundancy of data combined with monitoring of other parties can increase the security
level – yet, CT, CIRT and DTKI specify no mechanism for synchronization between logs,
while AKI, ARPKI and PoliCert embed mechanisms for synchronizing between log servers
in their modification protocols.
SK CT CIRT AKI ARPKI PoliCert DTKI
Security
MitM attack mitigation X × X X X X X
Attack prevention × × × X X X X
Certificate revocation X × X X X X X
Compromised parties for attack 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/3 n/n 2/3 1/1
Formal Security Proof × × × × X × X
Domain key recovery X × × X X X ×
Client connection privacy × X × X X X ×
Configurable security policies × × × X X X ×
Multiple certificates supported X X × × × X X
Proofs
Certificate present × X X X X X X
Certificate currency × × X X X X X
Certificate absent × × X X X X X
Consistency between logs × X X × × × X
Deployability
Extra client communication X × X × × X X
Synchronization required X × × X X X ×
Table 2.1: Comparison of domain-based PKI architectures using log servers [34], [39], [84], [85].
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2.3 Merkle Trees
The domain-centric architectures compared in section 2.2 use log servers based on a data
structure called Merkle Tree, originally introduced as digital signature for large amounts of
data [33]. A Merkle Tree allows efficient membership proofs for included data based on
hashes, and the security of a proof reduces to the collision resistance of the hash function
used for construction. We will give a rather informal description in this section which
suffices for our purposes – however, we refer the interested reader to the formalizations of
Yu et al. [39] which serve as a basis for the following.
2.3.1 Terminology
Before defining a Merkle Tree, we need to introduce some basic notions [86]: A directed
graph T = (N ,E) consisting of a set of nodes N and edges E ⊆ N ×N is called a tree if
N is empty or contains a node root without incoming edges (i.e. there’s no edge (n, root)
in E) and every other node in N has exactly one incoming edge and can be reached from
root, i.e. there exists a path root → n1 → n2 → · · · → nn−1 → nn defined by edges
(root,n1), (n1,n2), ..., (nn−1,nn) ∈ E for every node nn. Any node from which a node n is
reachable is called ancestor, any node which can be reached from n is called descendant.
Furthermore, the direct ancestor of a node is its parent, direct descendants are called
children. Nodes without children are referred to as leaves and nodes with the same parent
are said to be siblings. Note that, for any node n, N ′ ⊆ N containing all descendants of
n and n itself together with the corresponding edges E′ = E ∩ (N ′ ×N ′) define a tree
T ′ = (N ′,E′) which is called a subtree of T with root n.
Moreover, the length of the longest path from node n to a leaf is the height of n, while
depth references the path length from root to n. The set of nodes with same depth d is
called a level, the number of levels define the height (or depth) of the tree. While both
level and height of the root are 1, its depth is 0.
Every node of a binary tree has at most two children, which are additionally marked as
left or right child and ordered by a total relation. If each non-leaf node has two child
nodes, the tree is full. To be complete, the depth of each leaf must be either the height h
of the tree or h− 1. Finally, a full tree is perfect if all leaves have the same depth.
Basically, a Merkle Tree M is a full binary tree whose nodes are labeled by bit strings
[33]. While the leaves “contain” the actual data as label, any non-leaf node is marked with
the digest H(L(cleft)||L(cright)) of the labels of its left and right child cleft and cright,
respectively. For every node n, these are ordered by an in-order tree traversal relation
≺M such that cleft ≺M n ≺M cright. Further, M is always filled “left-to-right” – the left
subtree of any node in M must always be perfect and at least as high as the right one.
Thus, one can easily prove that the sequence of data in the leaves completely defines the
tree; even further, two Merkle Trees are equal if and only if they contain identical sequences




As previously mentioned, Merkle Trees allow one to generate a proof that data is included,
which is why we call them inclusion proofs. Of course, such a proof only exists if a node
nn labeled by bn is actually a leaf of a Merkle Tree – if so, its inclusion proof is defined as
(p, [b1, . . . , bk]) where p is the position of n and [b1, . . . , bk] is a sequence of node labels of
length k, which equals the depth of n in the tree.
The position of a node n in a Merkle Tree is typically a representation of the path to n,
but for further use, we will use it as a synonym for the index of the corresponding label
in the stored sequence of data. However, given the tree size N , an index can easily be
transformed to a path representation indicating for each node with which child to continue:
path(p,N) =

ε , if p = N = 1
left · path(p, 2k−1) , if p ≤ 2k−1 < N ≤ 2k for a k ∈N
right · path(p− 2k−1,N − 2k−1) , if 2k−1 < p ≤ N ≤ 2k for a k ∈N
The label sequence effectively contains necessary information to compute all hash values
which occur on the path root→ n1 → ...→ nn: Starting with n1, the values bi are labels
of the sibling of each node ni in the path. Note that even for (very) large trees, the proof
size remains logarithmic in the size of the Merkle Tree and therefore in the amount of
stored data.
The attentive reader may have already noticed that the information an inclusion proof
provides is enough to recompute the label of the root node, which we call root hash.
Assuming a collision-resistant hash function, the root hash can indeed effectively serve as
an integrity warranty for the tree contents, as two Merkle Trees only contain the same
data if their root hashes are equal. Hence, a valid inclusion proof (p, [b1, . . . , bk]) for a bit
string b, a root hash h and a tree size N has to fulfill three conditions:
1. p is a valid leaf index for a Merkle Tree of size N , i.e. 1 ≤ p ≤ N
2. k equals the number of levels except the root level in a Merkle Tree of size N
3. h is equal to Hchain(path(p,N), b, [b1, . . . , bk]), which is defined recursively as
Hchain(ε, b, []) = b
Hchain(ρ · left, b, [b1, b2, · · · , bk]) = Hchain(ρ,H(b||b1), [b2, · · · , bk])
Hchain(ρ · right, b, [b1, b2, · · · , bk]) = Hchain(ρ,H(b1||b), [b2, · · · , bk])
Besides the logarithmic size of the proof, note that the computation of Hchain and therefore
the proof verification also requires at most dlog2(N)e hash computations.
For example, consider the Merkle Tree in Figure 2.3. The inclusion proof for the node with
label b4 is (4, [b3,H(b1||b2),H(b5||b6)]), represented by gray nodes. To verify the inclusion
of b4 in a tree of size N = 6 with root hash h = H(H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))||H(b5||b6)),
we have to compute path(4, 6), which yields left · right · right.
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Figure 2.3: A Merkle Tree of size 6 with highlighted inclusion proof for the node with index 4 and
label b4.
Now, we can compute the hash chain and compare it to h:
Hchain(left · right · right, b4, [b3,H(b1||b2),H(b5||b6)]) =
Hchain(left · right,H(b3||b4), [H(b1||b2),H(b5||b6)]) =
Hchain(left,H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4)), [H(b5||b6)]) =
Hchain(ε,H(H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))||H(b5||b6)), []) =
H(H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))||H(b5||b6)) = h .
As stated above, the collision-resistance of the hash function H is obviously critical for
the security of an inclusion proof. Unfortunately, implementation-specific data encoding
may still result in ambiguous hash values – for example, by using an empty string for non-
existing values (which are then suddenly equal to actual empty string values). Therefore,
the tree structure has to be additionally included in the hash computation. This is typically
achieved by adding constants [87], e.g. by appending a prefix bit to distinguish between
leaves and interior nodes [79].
2.3.3 Extension Verification
While inclusion proofs create confidence in log servers regarding authenticity and integrity
of data, they reveal no information about the chronological evolution of a Merkle Tree.
For example, a malicious server could publish a root hash and tree size from an entirely
different (but valid) tree containing a value that should not exist; even if a client already
has information about a previous version of the original tree, they would still have to
accept this value based on its inclusion proof. We address this problem by prohibiting
the deletion of a value in the tree (i.e., the log becomes append-only) which allows one to
construct a consistency proof for verifying that a tree root is indeed an extension of a root
that is already trusted.
Consider two Merkle Trees M and M ′ with root hashes h and h′, respectively. Further,
let N and N ′ be the tree sizes of M and M ′ such that N < N ′. An efficient construction
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of a consistency proof makes use of the fact that, if a binary tree is append-only, perfect
(sub-)trees do not change – since a new value always gets the next larger index, it must be
added as the new rightmost leaf. This implies that if N = 2k for a k ∈N, it is enough to
verify an inclusion proof for h in M ′. Otherwise, we know by definition that the left subtree
of any node is perfect and can focus on the root node bp of the highest perfect subtree
PM in M which contains the rightmost leaf of the whole tree: Since PM is perfect and
therefore is not changed, it has to occur somewhere in M ′. Moreover, the left siblings of
both PM and its ancestors (which effectively form the inclusion proof sequence) are already
perfect and consequently also in M ′. Hence, it suffices to prove that M ′ contains PM and
to construct a valid proof of presence for M based on the proof for M ′. As a result, a
consistency proof for M and M ′ is defined as [bp, b1, . . . , bk] where [b1, . . . , bk] denotes the
inclusion proof sequence for bp in M ′. If M itself is perfect, bp is omitted from the proof.
The depth of M equals log2(N) if it is perfect, which implies that any imperfect tree
contains a perfect left subtree with depth blog2(N)c or, in other words, N − 2blog2(N)c
leaves in its right subtree. Thus, we can compute the depth of PM using the formula
dP (N) =
{
log2(N) , if N − 2blog2(N)c = 0
dP (N − 2blog2(N)c) , otherwise
which is equal to counting the trailing zeros in the binary representation of N . By cutting
off the last dP (N) words from path(N ,N ′), we receive a path representation ρ from the
root of M ′ to bp.
As mentioned above, ifM is perfect, a valid consistency proof forM andM ′ is [b1, . . . , bk]
if and only if N < N ′ and (N , [b1, . . . bk]) is a valid inclusion proof for the former root
labeled by h in M ′, i.e. Hchain(path(N ,N ′),h, [b1, . . . , bk]) = h′. Nevertheless, if M is not
perfect, the consistency proof [bp, b1, . . . , bk] must still fulfill Hchain(ρ, bp, [b1, . . . , bk]) = h′.
However, we then have to additionally convert it into an inclusion proof to be verified forM .
Since PM contains the rightmost leaf inM , its path representation is always a concatenation
of rights and its inclusion proof sequence only contains left children of all its ancestors.
As a consequence, every left in ρ means that the subtree containing bp in M ′ is a left child
of the corresponding node, so the label of the right sibling in [b1, . . . , bk] can be ignored
as its descending leaves have an index greater than N . Therefore, the proof of presence
(N , [bi0 , . . . , bin ]) for bp inM can be obtained through decomposeright(ρ, [b1, . . . , bk]) which
is defined as
decomposeright(ε, [b1, b2, . . . , bk]) = []
decomposeright(ρ · left, [b1, b2, . . . , bk]) = decomposeright(ρ, [b2, . . . , bk])
decomposeright(ρ · right, [b1, b2 . . . , bk]) = b1 :: decomposeright(ρ, [b2, . . . , bk])
where :: denotes the prepend operation of a single element to a sequence. Note that this
verification procedure for the extension of two Merkle Trees requires a proof which is
still logarithmic to the number of values in the extended tree. Also, only a maximum of
2 · dlog2(N ′)e hash computations are required, since at most two inclusion proofs have to
be verified.
As an example, we want to verify that the tree in Figure 2.4 is an extension of the Merkle
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Figure 2.4: A Merkle Tree of size 8 which is an extension of the tree in figure 2.3 with highlighted
inclusion proof for the perfect subtree with root label H(b5||b6) containing the node b6.
Tree in Figure 2.3, which we will denote as M ′ and M , respectively. Obviously, M isn’t
perfect, but there exists a perfect subtree containing the rightmost node b6 – we receive
it by computing dP (6) = 1 and slicing the last word off path(6, 8) = right · left · right,
which results in ρ = right · left and the corresponding node H(b5||b6) of M ′. Hence, the
consistency proof is [H(b5||b6),H(b7||b8),H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))].
The verification of this proof consists of proving inclusion of H(b5||b6) in M ′ as well as in
M . The former is the confirmation that
Hchain(right · left,H(b5||b6), [H(b7||b8),H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))])
= H(H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))||H(H(b5||b6)||H(b7||b8)))
which we generously leave to the reader; the latter requires decomposing the inclusion
proof for M ′ which lets us prove that H(b5||b6) is in M :
decomposeright(right · left, [H(b7||b8),H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))])
= decomposeright(right, [H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))])
= H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4)) :: decomposeright(ε, [])
= H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4)) :: [] = [H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))]
Because path(6, 6) yields right · right, we know that the path to H(b5||b6) in M is only
right (because of dP (6)) and can verify that it is indeed a member of M :
Hchain(right,H(b5||b6), [H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))])
= · · · = H(H(H(b1||b2)||H(b3||b4))||H(b5||b6))
2.3.4 Sparse Merkle Trees
While Merkle Trees can guarantee the presence of data by inclusion proofs, querying
particular values is inefficient because it requires one to iteratively visit each leaf until
the data is found. Even worse, proving absence of a value is basically recomputing the
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whole tree and therefore requires all leaves with their corresponding inclusion proofs to be
transferred. Therefore, Yu et al. describe a compact data structure that allows addition
and deletion of key-value pairs, as well as generating proofs of presence and absence using
an AVL-Tree [86] as LexTree in which each node contains a hash of its children in addition
to data [39]. However, we can achieve the same behavior using Merkle Trees [88].
Let S be a perfect Merkle Tree of size 2|H|, where |H| denotes the fixed length of the
outputs a hash function H yields. We introduce a constant ε denoting an empty leaf value
– hence, S can contain a sequence of key-value pairs with size n ≤ 2|H|, as the remaining
leaves are empty. Further, we associate a key-value pair with a particular leaf: As we
“read” the hash value of the key from left to right, we replace each 0 and 1 by left and
right, respectively, allowing us to follow the resulting path from the root to a leaf with
the hashed key as index. Thus, addition and deletion of a value is simply re-labeling the
corresponding leaf with either the value or ε. Finally, S can provide a proof of presence for
a key-value pair by generating an inclusion proof of size |H| for the associated leaf with
the actual value – to prove absence, the leaf must be labeled with ε.
Considering a real-world hash function like SHA-256, a perfect Merkle Tree would have
2256 leaves – it is therefore obviously not computable. Nevertheless, Laurie and Kasper
observed that in a Sparse Merkle Tree (or SMT), almost all leaves are empty, which means
that their parents are labeled by H(ε||ε), their parent nodes by H(H(ε||ε)||H(ε||ε)), and
so on [88]. We denote these digests that only derive from empty leaves as (empty) default
hashes. Since they are identical for most nodes and can be cached, it suffices to compute
digests individually only for non-empty leaves and their ancestors. Even more, the tree
can be represented efficiently by caching interior nodes whose children are both labeled by
non-default hashes, so-called branches [89]. The branch cache usually contains N − 1 nodes
for N values stored in the SMT, but depending on memory consumption, it can be shrunk
by probabilistically removing branches or extended by additionally caching the children of
a branch. Regardless of these adjustments, the time required for both modification and
proof construction scales as O(logN) per leaf.
In terms of security, a Sparse Merkle Tree has a major disadvantage compared to an
append-only Merkle Tree, that is history independence: Consistency proofs cannot be
created, as they rely on extension of an unmodifiable tree. Hence, we have to consider
attacks in a multi-instance setting due to incomparability of several SMTs (e.g. resulting
from a modification). In [53], Melara et al. present a collision-resistant hash strategy HC
for this scenario: A node n with children cleft and cright is hashed by
HC(n) =

H(kempty||kt||i||d) , if n is labeled by an empty default hash
H(kleaf ||kt||i||d||v) , if n is a non-empty leaf with value v
H(HC(cleft)||HC(cright)) , otherwise
where H is a hash function, d denotes the depth of n and i is its unique index (for an
interior node, i is the d-bit prefix of the leaf indexes reachable from n). Both d and i ensure
that preimages cannot be valid across multiple locations in a tree, while the tree-specific
unique constant kt protects against second-preimage attacks using multiple trees. Without
them, an adversary could search across an arbitrary number of SMTs and locations in
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parallel to find a hash collision [89]. While in logs, one has to prefix a bit before hashing
to differentiate nodes and leaves, we can safely ignore this for sparse trees as a proof of
presence is always of fixed length – however, it is necessary to distinguish empty leaves
and zero-length values by using constants kempty and kleaf because otherwise, we would
lose the benefits of the sparseness property and had to calculate all 2|H|− 1 labels on every
change. Yet, even the hash strategy HC cannot protect a client against a malicious SMT
server which changes a particular leaf the client requested, but resets this update if anyone
else queries the value. As a solution, root hash changes of an SMT could be logged in a
verifiable manner so that they become publicly visible [88].
2.3.5 Verifiable Log-Backed Map
As described in [90], a Verifiable Log-Backed Map is a Sparse Merkle Tree combined with
an append-only Merkle Tree as operations log. The SMT is populated by applying the
sequence of mutation operations stored in the log leaves, and the resulting root incorporates
the size and root hash from the underlying log (in addition to the root hash). If further, a
separate verifiable tree stores a history of the map size together with the corresponding
root hash, any client can verify that the current view is consistent with previous versions of
the map by a consistency proof of the underlying log and that it is indeed the latest version
by an inclusion proof of the history log. Moreover, they can trust the proofs obtained
from the server, because other parties auditing the history log would observe malicious
changes to the log-backed map. Furthermore, an auditor could replay the underlying log
to verify that the server behaved correctly over time. Note that we use the term auditor
rather than client, since this requires downloading the entire dataset and only a small
number of dedicated clients is expected to do so. For this reason, we make the same
distinction in Table 2.2, which compares the data structures append-only Merkle Tree
(Log), Sparse Merkle Tree (Map) and Log-Backed Map regarding computation time and
proof size. Efficiently means that exactly one proof is required, whose size and time are
logarithmic in the number of values stored and therefore can/should be performed by
clients, whereas Audit denotes recomputing the root hash using the downloaded dataset.
Finally, any proof that is either not bounded logarithmically in time and size, or depends
on multiple proofs for at least some other entries in the tree is considered Impractical.
2.3.6 Fields of Application
Several public key infrastructure architectures developed for TLS security use append-only
Merkle Trees. CT signs and stores TLS certificates in this data structure, which allows
CAs to provide non-repudiable proofs to domains. These can pass them on to a client when
establishing a TLS connection, and auditors can validate the consistency between versions of
the logs. To handle the revocation of such certificates efficiently, the supplementary system
Revocation Transparency [88] uses a Sparse Merkle Tree indicating whether a particular
certificate has been revoked or not, but still requires full audits to verify correct behavior
of the log and map. As an alternative, AKI introduces a variant of Merkle Trees called
LexTree that contains certificates sorted lexicographically by their domains and is also used
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Log Map Log-Backed Map
Prove inclusion of value Efficiently Efficiently Efficiently
Prove non-inclusion of value Impractical Efficiently Efficiently
Retrieve provable value for key Impractical Efficiently Efficiently
Retrieve provable current value for key Impractical No Efficiently
Prove append-only Efficiently No Efficiently*
Enumerate all entries Audit Audit Audit
Prove correct operation Efficiently No Audit
∗Although append-only can be proven efficiently for the underlying log, verifying the correctness of an
append-only operation requires an Audit.
Table 2.2: Comparison of append-only Merkle Trees (Logs), Sparse Merkle Trees (Maps) and
Log-Backed Maps according to [90].
in ARPKI. CIRT adapts this idea and combines it with a traditional append-only Merkle
Tree to persist combinations of a certificate and the corresponding root hash, whereby
(non-)inclusion and consistency can easily be verified. However, inconsistencies between
these trees can only be detected by third-party auditors that mirror both and verify all
modifications. PoliCert adapts concepts of ARPKI and CIRT by using an append-only
Merkle Tree and a LexTree together with heavy protocols for modification, so that in
addition to presence and absence proofs of certificates, consistency proofs between both
of them as well as their earlier versions are possible. As mentioned before, DTKI uses a
special AVL-Tree as LexTree to implement a data structure equivalent to Sparse Merkle
Trees. This tree is combined with append-only Merkle Trees to maintain associations
between top-level domains and logs containing the corresponding certificates.
Because Merkle Tree proofs include very little information about other values stored in
the tree, they are also a means for privacy in transparent logging. The provably secure
authenticated data structure Balloon [91] combines an append-only Merkle Tree as event
log with a lexicographically-sorted treap used like a Merkle Tree [87] as key-value store to
provide efficient (non-)membership proofs. Unfortunately, treaps store values in each node,
which requires information about key-value pairs of ancestors to be leaked in a proof for
recomputing the root hash [51]. CONIKS [53], a privacy-preserving key verification service
developed for end-to-end encrypted communication systems, allows clients to manage and
monitor their key-bindings efficiently using a Merkle Prefix Tree, which is a dynamically
sized SMT where empty subtrees are represented by empty nodes. Indexes are obtained
by transforming user names with a verifiable random function before hashing to prevent
collision attacks based on index prefixes. A protocol for lookups and monitoring hides the
total number of registered bindings.
Blockchain-based PKIs like Claimchain [92] use lexicographically-sorted Merkle Trees in
each block to provide efficient verifiable lookups for domain certificates, whereas Chainiac
[57] uses an append-only tree to compute a signature over binary software resources.
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Originally developed as a cryptographic signature for static datasets, Merkle Trees have
also been investigated in the broader field of incremental cryptography [93] for dynamic
data. Li et al. [94] apply the structure and mechanisms of a Merkle Tree to a B-Tree
[95] which allows them to authenticate index structures for outsourced databases. The
characteristics of incremental Merkle Trees have been formalized and proven in [96].
In live systems, Merkle Trees are used from distributed systems to decentralized net-
works where authenticity and integrity are essential. Besides public-key infrastructure
architectures, the fields of applications include peer-to-peer networks (e.g., used for crypto
currency), NoSQL databases, and distributed file and revision control systems. The
blockchain-based peer-to-peer networks Ethereum [97] and Bitcoin [98] use Merkle Trees
for storing transactions in the hash chain. Each block in the chain contains a tree of
transactions to verify local copies. Nevertheless, if a client wants to check only a specific
transaction, they can just download the chain of block headers that contain the root hash
and an inclusion proof instead of the whole tree [99]. Some NoSQL database systems like
Apache Cassandra [100] and Amazon Dynamo [101] rely on Merkle Trees to enforce the
synchronization of replicas on nodes. Each node exchanges a tree of the values it stores
with the requesting node, which then compares the root hashes to decide whether it has to
synchronize with a node or not [101]. Distributed file systems such as IPFS [102] or ZFS
[103], as well as revision control systems like Git [104] and Mercurial [105] build specialized
Merkle Trees containing file content hashes. They are used as an identifier for content
addressing, as a checksum for tamper resistance and as a mean for deduplication – further,
they allow a simple distribution of version changes [102].
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In order to build a system for effectively defending clients against targeted attacks based on
tampering, we have to answer fundamental questions regarding its functionality and design.
First, we have to ask how alteration can generally be detected – since several proposals
dealing with third-party adversaries [27], [29] suggest verifying the resource hashes, we
take up the idea. This also seems to be the most straightforward approach, as result
checking [106] or similar methods would require a full specification and implementation of
verification procedures for any part of the software. However, one needs digests to compare
the computed resource hashes to, which raises the question of how they can be delivered to
clients with regard to our adversary model. In this respect, a centralized architecture with
a single server on which application developers can publish the hashes is obviously out
of the picture. Hence, there are two options: We could either have clients communicate
directly with each other and exchange the hash values, or we could install a public key
infrastructure with multiple server components that can guarantee integrity of the digests
through verifiable proofs and security protocols.
In case of a compromised party, both need a mechanism to achieve consensus. If we
demand that at any time, all participants have to agree on the hash value of a particular
resource, the former solution implies that each client has to know everybody else and any
resource digest of any web application that another random client could visit. Therefore,
they must have been “registered” by their publishers – which in turn requires a process for
establishing trust, so that a client can check the origin of the hashes. For example, a digital
signature could provide a remedy, but only works if clients have the publishers’ public keys
built-in (including update capability if it gets lost or compromised). Further, we would
need a kind of update procedure for new resource versions. Since all clients must agree,
each one would have to be permanently online in case of an update or be left out when
voting for the correct digest until they have synchronized with the others. For this reason,
we could weaken this criterion of strong consistency such that only a quorum of clients is
necessary for believing in the integrity of a hash value. Unfortunately, the adversary could
compromise some of them as well, and would win if they control at least the quorum on
average.
On the other hand, the latter option promises the properties of PKIs described in chapter
2 and shifts the obligation to store all the information from clients to servers. Because these
are continuously available, consensus can be broken down to monitoring the synchronization
process, which allows publishers to easily register and update their resource hashes by the
use of efficient protocols. If on top, verifiable proofs can be generated for any action of the
servers, neither clients nor publishers have to trust them blindly. Nevertheless, we must be
careful – some PKIs no longer offer protection if just a single server has been compromised,
while others also fail once a part of the infrastructure has been successfully attacked. Thus,
they provide even less security than the quorum approach discussed above.
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A decentralized PKI still seems more promising than a fully distributed system, if we
manage to avoid pitfalls like failure on compromise of a single party described previously.
Although the desired properties for our scenario might differ in part from those that
typically apply to TLS infrastructures, we could at least take our inspiration from the
architectures compared in section 2.2.4, which, for example, already allow updates and
deletions by certificate revocation and can prevent MitM attacks. However, we have
to figure out which characteristics should be considered important to design a PKI for
our needs. Hence, the following section 3.1 clarifies on which requirements we focus for
our approach. Afterwards, section 3.2 gives an overview of the participating entities we
consider in our system, while section 3.3 defines the formats that we use to structure
necessary information. Bringing it all together, we describe a communication protocol
that ensures the required level of security in section 3.4 and analyze it in section 3.5.
Subsequently, section 3.6 explains some aspects of our prototypical implementation and we
finally conclude this chapter with a discussion about possible improvements and economic
considerations in section 3.7.
3.1 Requirements
Of course, we want to build a system that makes it almost impossible to successfully
attack a specific client through altered resources. Therefore, the following focuses on major
security properties our approach must fulfill. Nevertheless, quality is taken into account as
well – besides the efficiency of our protocols, an uncomplicated deployment is essential for
being accepted by both publishers and clients.
3.1.1 Security Attributes
Naturally, our main focus lies on detecting resources that have been tampered with. Yet,
we would like to satisfy additional security requirements: If an adversary launches an
attack, it should become permanently visible, regardless of whether it is a MitM attack or
executed by a compromised party. Of course, this requires that we know the identity of
each participant including publishers. Our system must therefore legitimate registrations,
updates and deletions of identities and application resources.
Tamper Protection This is the core property we want to satisfy. If a client downloads
an application resource from a particular address that differs from the resource other
clients receive from the same link, this must be detected even on first access. As we
solve this through a public key infrastructure, this implies that the resource hash and the
corresponding registered hash must be identical.
Attack Prevention Obviously, tamper protection can only be achieved if the hash
provided by our PKI is correct. Thus, we have to detect and prevent attacks on participating
entities. An adversary must not be able to impersonate a participant in our system through
a MitM attack, nor to foist bogus digests on a client if they infiltrated some of them.
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Note that we explicitly demand resilience as long as not all involved parties have been
compromised.
Operation Legitimization In order to prevent an attacker from simply publishing hash
values for modified resources, the involved participants must ensure that a publisher’s
identity is known to the system and validate that they actually own the domain of the
application they want to register. Further, updating requires checks of additional meta
information, e.g. of an incremented software version number to indicate an intentional
resource change.
Attack Visibility If an adversary ever succeeds in compromising entities or registering
a bogus value, the attack must be publicly visible to other parts of the system, as well as to
publishers and clients. Then, anyone willing to monitor or audit the operations and stored
hashes is able to detect it and can identify both the resources which have been tampered
with and the responsible party behind it.
Scalability Despite the fact that scalability is commonly considered a quality attribute,
we have to look at it in terms of security. As mentioned above, some decentralized PKI
architectures fail if a fixed number of servers has been infiltrated. Hence, we prefer a
protocol which ensures that the number of compromised parties required for a successful
attack scales with the overall number of participating servers, as this results in a more
resilient system regarding security concerns.
3.1.2 Quality Attributes
Although the functional requirements above would suffice for our purpose, we should also
consider ease of use. Since users might despise security solutions because of poor usability
[107], it is worth taking care of simplicity to lay the foundation for productive use.
Simple Deployment We do not want to force developers to change their deployment
process, nor browser vendors to implement our protocol. Ideally, publishers should be
able to easily integrate ready-to-use components in their scripts that require only minimal
configuration effort and deal with the detailed communication steps for registrations,
updates and deletions. Moreover, it should be possible for interested users to download
and install a lightweight browser extension that ensures tamper protection without further
actions.
Efficiency When accessing a web application, the verification process should not block
the page load. This isn’t even crucial, since browsers typically sandbox web pages by
default [108], [109] and prevent the application from accessing sensitive information without
the user’s permission. However, verifying both the resource digests and the actions of other
participants must not cause unnecessary network consumption or waste computational
resources. Otherwise, this could lead to a significant delay the user won’t tolerate. In
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contrast, publishing new hashes might take some time if it fits seamlessly in the (usually
time-consuming) deployment process.
3.2 Participants
Now that the requirements for our system have been defined, we can move on to assigning
the resulting tasks to participants. As we already know from section 2.2.3, a domain-centric
architecture is the most suitable because it also allows the application owner to check
actions of other parties against their policies. Therefore, we follow the separation of
concerns proposed in several of the log-based approaches [34], [39], [80], [82], so that we
can benefit from the transparency and security concepts they provide. Consequently, we
consider the following entities as participants in our public key infrastructure:
Publisher As the creator of the web application, a Publisher is responsible for registering
and updating the resource hashes of the current version. They have to introduce themselves
to other parties and to reveal the domains they own, so that none of them is able to
deceive clients with bogus digests for applications of others. Further, clients should receive
a fingerprint of the current hash values when accessing their service, since this helps in
preventing attacks by a compromised party.
Certificate Authority Due to the need to verify information about publishers, we
introduce an independent Certificate Authority (CA) to legitimate their actions. Initially
contacted by a publisher who transmits their domains, it certifies the ownership by signing
them together with the publisher’s public key. In order to register application resource
hashes, the digests have to be signed by this key to prove the publisher’s identity. Hence,
a CA supervises the modification process and monitors the operations of other authorities
and log servers for correct behavior.
Integrity Log Server Because each CA can only have knowledge of the publishers and
applications it accepted, our system relies on parties named Integrity Log Servers (ILS) to
store the hash values. Each of them maintains a verifiable log-backed map described in
section 2.3.5 to save publisher keys and resource hashes. Integrity can therefore be verified
through inclusion and consistency proofs which are accessible to all other participants.
On modification, ILSes synchronize autonomously between themselves and provide signed
proofs to CAs which hold the old Merkle Tree roots to verify correctness of the operations.
Monitor Optionally, anyone willing to audit the actions of CAs and ILSes can act as
a Monitor. This party replays the modification entries in the append-only log of an ILS
and ensures that the resulting map is equal to the snapshot provided by the log server.
Since CAs offer signed tree roots to compare the ILS roots to, a monitor can verify global
consistency among CAs and ILSes by verifying all inclusion proofs.
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Client When accessing a website, the browser extension installed on the client’s computer
requests the resource hashes together with the publisher’s key from a CA. After forwarding
the request to an ILS, each CA verifies and signs the returned consistency and inclusion
proof before responding the latter to the client. After verifying the signatures of each
participant and checking against the fingerprint provided by the publisher, the extension
compares the digests with hash values it computed for received resource files to detect
tampering. Typically, global consistency is not verified by the browser extension because
this might be quite time-consuming. Still, clients can explicitly take on the monitor role if
they want to.
Auditor Since our overall objective is to design a security system for web applications, we
provide a mechanism to include trustworthy results of code analyses. We do not restrict the
method to use, so it can range from simple code reviews to formal verifications. However,
the analysis has to be carried out by an approved expert that is called Auditor. They can
announce their public key just like the publisher and register assertions for an application
which are built into and verified by the browser extension. Nevertheless, such analysis
results are only considered valid if the publisher provides a corresponding fingerprint to
the client.
Although auditors and their assertions are a useful means to inspire client confidence in
the application, they are not essential for protecting our system against tampering. In fact,
the combination of CAs, ILSes and publishers alone guarantees that the core property can be
verified by clients. However, auditors are indeed among the entities that can create, update
or delete entries. But, since we assume that the private keys of at least CAs and ILSes are
never accessible to any third party, we can ensure authenticity by committing them to sign
each modification and enforce privacy through public key encryption. As CAs additionally
legitimate and verify every operation of all other participants, our architecture effectively
prevents MitM attacks and even invalid modifications by one or more compromised parties.
Further, such attacks are always visible: The append-only log of the log-backed map
allows anyone to prove consistency and inclusion of any action ever made. Even if all CAs
and ILSes are compromised, clients can still match possibly forged digests against signed
fingerprints from the publisher.
Obviously, this brief description is not enough to convince skeptical readers of the security
features we claim. That is why we go into detail in the following sections. Before defining
the actual protocol, we have to deal with how to structure the information that is needed
in addition to hashes in a meaningful way.
3.3 Certificates
As the name certificate authority suggests, we use a simple certificate format to bundle
entity specific attributes. For example, publishers and auditors must identify themselves
with both their public key and their domains in order to create application- or audit-specific
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certificates – hence, they are combined in a Publisher Certificate that is signed by the CAs.
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the different types that we consider in our system.
Besides domain attributes, the certificates contain further parameters for configuring
the registration process and attesting its correctness, which are similar to those proposed
in ARPKI. This allows participants to actively select who they want to include in the
publishing process. The cas attribute specifies an ordered list of CAs that are contacted
sequentially to review and sign the certificate, ilses contains a sequence of log servers
where the accepted certificate is stored and caMin indicates the minimum number of CAs
required to consider a subsequent certificate valid on update. Note that we demand that at
least 2 CAs are involved as the lower bound for this parameter. Since these attributes are
configurable by publishers and auditors, this might be a security risk: Using two disjoint
subsets of both CAs and ILSes, an adversary could register two certificates for the same
application. However, we do not want to restrict the freedom of an honest publisher if they
do not trust a party. Further, imagine an existing system would require all authorities and
log servers to be involved: if it was extended by new CAs or ILSes, certificates which are
already registered would become invalid since they would have to be respectively signed
by or stored in all of them. Thus, we accept this vulnerability and rely on monitors to
verify global consistency. Nevertheless, we still strongly recommend to register all currently
available CAs and ILSes in a publisher’s and auditor’s configuration. After the specified
CAs verified the configuration and domain attributes of a raw certificate and ensured that
the validity does not start in the past, they sign it for the publisher who then combines




+ cas : String[] {cas->size() > 1}
+ ilses : String[] {ilses->notEmpty()}
+ caMin : Integer {caMin > 1}





+ notBefore : Date





Figure 3.1: The common and process related certificate attributes. All of them are read-only, but
the annotations were conveniently omitted.
So far, we have not addressed the questions of what the registration process of a certificate
looks like and how it can be confirmed to the publisher on success. While we leave the
former to the next section, the latter is a matter of signature structuring. Since each CA
listed by the publisher must approve the modifications of ILS entries, we could broadcast
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the proofs they are supposed to sign and respond with a bunch of signatures. However,
if we contact only one of them which confirms the operation and subsequently contacts
the next one (and so on), we reduce the network traffic and achieve that the actions of
each are verified. To indicate that a CA accepted a certificate and verified the behavior of
all previous ones, we build a signature chain like in ARPKI that we call MultiSignature.
After the ILS created a signature of the certificate, each CA signs the previous multi-
signature on approval - the old one is then stored in the initially empty chain. Finally, it is
handed over to the publisher as acceptanceConfirmation of a RegisteredCertificate
(see Figure 3.2), who can recursively verify that the process has been executed correctly.
In addition, they can sign it as well and provide the result as fingerprint to the client.
RegisteredCertificate
+ certificate : Certificate
MultiSignature
+ chain : MultiSignature [0..1]
+ signature : Byte[]
+ acceptanceConfirmation
1
Figure 3.2: The registered certificate containing the confirmation signature.
3.3.1 Publisher Certificate
Both publishers and auditors own a Publisher Certificate, as they are able to create,
update or delete entries. Of course, the CAs could simply verify each Application or Audit
Certificate manually by checking the domain ownership and contacting the requesting
party. However, we expect resource changes due to version updates to be much more
frequent than key loss or compromise which implies an enormous effort for the authorities.
This encourages one to adopt the idea of master keys as used in DTKI because certificates




+ version : Integer {version > 0}
+ subject : String
+ domains : String[] {unique,ordered}
+ expectedLifetime : Integer
CryptoKey
+ key : Byte[]
+ format : String
+ subjectPublicKey
1
Figure 3.3: The domain-specific attributes of a Publisher Certificate.
35
3 Certificate-based Resource Alteration Prevention
As shown in Figure 3.3, our equivalent is the subjectPublicKey field of a Publisher
Certificate. Each CA verifies the unique subject name of a publisher or auditor and the
domains they claim to own, so that afterwards, it can automatically accept all Application
or Audit Certificates signed by the corresponding private key.
Although auditors typically won’t deploy web applications under the domains they
specified, this field must still be provided in order to be contactable by others. Because
we consider the key loss of a master key in contrast to DTKI, Publisher Certificates
have a version number that must be incremented for every new one. For simplicity, we
only include the encoding format for public key bit strings instead of fully specifying the
algorithm with optional parameters like in X.509 certificates.
The purpose of expectedLifetime is to help clients in noticing timed-release attacks.
An infiltrated publisher could analyze the time frame in which a client usually accesses their
service. Afterwards, they publish a proper certificate for the modified resources they want
to attack with that is valid only for the observed time window and immediately replaced
by the “secure” Application Certificate when it expires. This makes it very likely that
the target trusts and uses the tampered resources, while it nearly prevents third parties
from effectively analyzing the resources for vulnerabilities. On the other hand, a malicious
auditor could prevent a specific client from using a service by publishing a bogus Audit
Certificate the same way. Therefore, we demand that a Publisher Certificate contains the
approximate duration of the release cycle which conforms to the expected lifetime of an
Application or Audit Certificate. As we consider significantly shorter values as suspicious,
such attacks can be detected by monitors and exposed by analyzing the resources listed
in the short-lived certificate. Since the latter requires actual source files, publishers must
ensure that they are still available on request for at least one year, if they do not want to
be listed as untrustworthy.
3.3.2 Application Certificate
With a registered Publisher Certificate, the domain owner is able to publish digests for a web
application. The corresponding Application Certificate includes a set of resources, each
described by its resourceHash and the contentUrl it is received from. The application
itself can be identified by a unique applicationUrl that must be a subdomain (with an
optional path suffix) of some registered domain listed under the publisher field. This also
contains the public key so that CAs and clients can verify the included publisher’s signature
to ensure that the attributes are authentic. The deploymentVersion is incremented on
each update to indicate an intended change of the resource digests by the publisher. Note
that the remaining properties shown in Figure 3.4 are similar to those of a Publisher
Certificate. In fact, the registration process for each of our three certificates does not need
to distinguish between them.
3.3.3 Audit Certificate
We want to encourage domain owners to have their applications analyzed for security






+ publisher : RegisteredCertificate
+ deploymentVersion : Integer
+ applicationUrl : String
+ signature : Byte[]
Resource
+ contentUrl : String
+ resourceHash : Byte[]
+ resources
1..*
Figure 3.4: The structure of an Application Certificate to describe resource digests.
general public, publishers can contact an auditor they trust and who is registered in our
system. After the analyst applied analysis methods of their choice, they publish an Audit
Certificate shown in Figure 3.5 for an applicationUrl and fixed deploymentVersion.
This ensures that each resource digest update has to be reviewed so that applications
cannot pretend to be audited based on outdated certificates. One might wonder why we do
not just use the Application Certificate that already contains the necessary information –
the reason is that the listed resources may differ. While the application resources have to
include all files transmitted to the client’s browser, the Audit Certificate usually specifies
only a subset of them. For example, font definitions, broadly used style sheets or third-party
libraries are not likely to be analyzed separately in each review.
The results of the analysis are stated in audit properties. Besides an expressive name,
they provide a description comprehensible for end users. Furthermore, they refer to
assertions built into the extension by unique identifiers – however, since we may not be
able to design a verification algorithm for all properties that come to an auditor’s mind,
this field remains optional.
Finally, the analyst affixes their signature to the mentioned audit attributes together
with the configuration parameters used for registration. In the following, we take a detailed
look at the communication flow and the individual protocol steps, which guarantee us the
required security and quality features of our system.
3.4 Protocol
We now have all the building blocks to proceed with specifying the protocol. Based on
the comparison of domain-centric public key infrastructure architectures using log servers
in the last chapter, we choose ARPKI to take inspiration from – the attentive reader will
have guessed it, since we have already introduced some ARPKI-oriented certificate fields
that a publisher can configure. The main reason for this choice is simple: ARPKI is the
only PKI that is formally proven to offer resilience until all certificate authorities and log
servers have been compromised. As we know from section 3.3, the publisher can specify
which of them are involved in the registration process and thus determine the level of
security. However, we believe that a domain owner willing to participate in our system has
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+ auditor : RegisteredCertificate
+ applicationUrl : String
+ applicationVersion : Integer
+ resources : Resource[]
+ methods : String[]
+ signature : Byte[]
AuditProperty
+ name : String
+ description : String
+ assertions : String[0..*] {unique}
+ properties
0..*
Figure 3.5: The Audit Certificate holding the results of a code analysis.
a great interest in providing as much security as possible and includes all available CAs and
ILSes in their certificates. Of course, this is not the only feature that makes ARPKI the
best choice. Besides attack prevention and a recovery mechanism, it guarantees operation
legitimization and attack visibility as defined in section 3.1. It also fulfills a requirement
we have not yet considered in detail. Because values can be appended to the configuration
attributes of a certificate on each update, the resilience of the architecture scales with the
number of authorities and log servers.
Although we can benefit from some core concepts of ARPKI, there are open issues that
we need to address. Since it was designed for TLS, the trusted party is the publisher, not
the client as in our case. Therefore, we need an additional query that allows the client
to trust the publisher’s behavior. Further, additional auditors must be included. The
biggest change, however, is due to the fact that ARPKI forces CAs to maintain their
own Merkle Tree. To verify a proof of presence or absence generated by the ILS, they
have to synchronize their trees periodically with the log by replaying all modifications – if
afterwards, the root hashes are equal, the proof can be validated. This is a disproportionate
effort to ensure consistency as it requires additional requests, more processing power and
potentially enormous storage capacity. Hence, we adopt some ideas of DTKI (whose
properties have been formally proven) in our protocol and equip ILSes with verifiable
log-backed maps instead of lexicographically sorted trees. As a result, a log server can
create consistency proofs that can be verified by other participants if they have stored only
a root they trust. Since this eliminates the need for CAs to operate a separate tree, it
reduces the required computing and storage capacity. Further, the proofs are of small size
and can therefore be directly included in the modification process of a certificate, making
additional requests unnecessary.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the message flow of our protocol that results from these modifications.
Because monitoring can be performed by any participant, separate third-party monitors
are omitted for the sake of clarity. The steps (1) - (5) describe the registration process for
the publisher, which also applies to an auditor. Afterwards, the publisher can query the
audit confirmation (6) which they include together with the application fingerprint in the
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Figure 3.6: The communication flow of the proposed architecture.
web page served to the client (7). Finally, the end user requests the Application and Audit
Certificate (8) - (9) to verify resource integrity. The individual steps will be examined in
more detail in the following sections.
In general, the communication between two participants is always encrypted with the
recipient’s public key that is either known in advance or included in the request. Each
message sent by a party who is responsible for a registered certificate (i.e. a publisher,
auditor, CA or ILS) is additionally signed by its sender and, if different, the original creator.
Since this requires that the public keys of these parties are known for authentication, we
demand that at least the keys of CAs and ILSes are known to publishers, auditors and
clients in advance. This actually seems to be enough to prevent impersonation attacks:
Messages from both of them contain critical information like certificates and corresponding
proofs which must be authentic, whereas the communication between publishers and
auditors or clients basically yields fingerprints for comparison that are in turn signed by
CAs and ILSes. However, an adversary could still succeed with a replay attack, e.g. to
feign an invalid certificate as still valid. In contrast to ARPKI that cannot prevent such
attacks, we include a nonce that is defined by the initiator of a request in each associated
message and signed by every receiving party on response.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that all participants rely on the same collision-
resistant hash function, existentially unforgeable digital signatures, secure encryption and
decryption schemes, and that clients, publishers and auditors use the same encoding for
resource digests. Further, CAs and ILSes are supposed to immediately stop the protocol
run on failure (e.g. due to a lost message or an invalid verification result). Additionally,
the latter have to revert any persistent change if subsequent parties in the run fail. Finally,
we expect a CA to efficiently protect itself against Denial-of-Service attacks, while we do
not demand this of ILSes. Nevertheless, they should also have a large bandwidth available.
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3.4.1 Certificate Generation
As stated in section 3.3, a publisher must have their certificate signed by the CAs listed in
the corresponding field to obtain a certificate that they can publish. We may have swept
that under the table in the communication flow above, since this begins with the actual
registration – so we catch up on the description here. Of course, this and the following
procedures also apply equally to auditors – however, we only focus on the publisher in our
explanations.
Regardless of its type, the publisher creates the certificate they want to register based
on a static configuration file containing the ARPKI specific attributes. Obviously, the
signatures field remains unset. Afterwards, they contact each CA listed in the corre-
sponding sequence using a GenerateRequest depicted in Figure 3.7. After automatically
validating the process related properties, they have to verify the domain attributes –
while this is a manual step for Publisher Certificates, the other types can be verified
and accepted automatically due to the publisher’s signature. Finally, each CA signs the
certificate in a GenerateResponse that is encrypted using the publicKey provided in the
request. If the nonce and the corresponding signature are correct, the publisher combines
all certSignature fields and appends them to the certificate.
<<abstract>>
Request
+ nonce : Integer
+ publicKey : CryptoKey
<<abstract>>
SignedRequest
+ signature : Byte[]
GenerateRequest
+ cert : Certificate
<<abstract>>
Response
+ request : Request
+ signature : MultiSignature
GenerateResponse
+ request : GenerateRequest
+ certSignature : Byte[]
+ request
1
Figure 3.7: The GenerateRequest and GenerateResponse message classes. All attributes are
read-only, but the annotations were conveniently omitted.
3.4.2 Log Modification
Now we are ready to follow the communication flow as shown in Figure 3.6. At first, the
publisher has to decide what they want to do with their generated certificate – register it
initially, update an existing one or even delete the current entry. Accordingly, they send
one of the inheritors of a ModificationRequest depicted in Figure 3.8 to the first CA
listed in the certificate field as the first step (1). Afterwards, the next stages of the process
can be roughly divided into Initialization, Validation, Synchronization, Modification, Proof
Generation and Verification. Note that, although both the auditor and publisher contact
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+ acceptanceConfirmation : MultiSignature
+ consistencyProof : Proof
+ logProof : LogProof
+ mapProof : MapProof
+ root : MapRoot
+ acknowledgements : SyncAcknowledge[]
+ consistencySignature : Byte[]
+ logSignature : Byte[]
+ mapSignature : Byte[]
+ rootSignature : MultiSignature
+ request
1
Figure 3.8: The ModificationRequest and ModificationResponse message classes used for
registration, update and deletion of a certificate.
Initialization When CA1 receives the message, it performs some verification steps to
check whether the request is valid: First, it verifies the publisher’s signature of the message,
as well as of the certificate to authenticate the sender using the public key contained in
the Publisher Certificate. Second, it examines the participants of the process: The cas
sequence of the certificate must contain at least caMin ≥ 2 different entities, one of which
is CA1, and naturally the ils field must not be empty. Actually, this is enough to continue
with modification, as the configuration fields of the certificate have already been accepted
during generation. Therefore, CA1 appends the request to a pending requests queue, signs
the message from the publisher and forwards it to the first element of the ils list, which
is ILS1 in our case (2).
Validation Initially, the ILS behaves very similar to a CA when processing a modification
request. It verifies the signatures and checks the fields for validity. Afterwards, however,
it performs a lookup for the publisher’s certificates of the same type and domain as the
request certificate: For registration, there must be no entry in the log, whereas one has
to be present for update or deletion (which is basically an update operation). Further,
an Application Certificate requires the associated Publisher Certificate to be registered
regardless of the operation, and an additional Audit Certificate needs both of them. The
term domain may sound like nonsense in connection with a Publisher Certificate – still,
we use it to indicate the unique key for the corresponding certificate. Application and
Audit Certificates are naturally identified by the applicationUrl they were issued for,
and the publisher can be identified by its subject name. If the validation steps have been
completed successfully, the ILS creates the basis for the fingerprint that is later passed on
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to the publisher, the acceptanceConfirmation. At this early stage, however, this only
includes the signature created by signing the certificate digest.
Synchronization Before the ILS can proceed with executing the requested change, it
has to check whether the publisher listed more than only one ILS in their certificate. If
so, the modification should be synchronized beforehand, because it is a rather bad idea
to modify the log first: Imagine that one of the ILSes to synchronize with declines the
modification due to a (non-)existing certificate - if ILS1 and, consequently, also all other
contacted ILSes have already executed the operation, preserving consistency becomes a
difficult task if we take network reliability into account, not to mention the huge amount
of additional requests that would be necessary. Thus, our main ILS1 sends a SyncRequest
given in Figure 3.9 to the other ones which verify the request in the same way as ILS1 earlier.
On success, each of them stores the request in a queue and responds with a SyncResponse
containing the request hash to inform the ILS that triggered the synchronization about
its acceptance. Note that this digest is not accompanied by a signature, since in the
direct communication between two ILSes, the overall message signature is enough for
authenticity. Once ILS1 has collected such responses from all the others, it notifies them
sequentially with a SyncCommit that they can remove the queued request and make the
actual change. This message contains the acceptanceConfirmation that is subsequently
signed by each receiving ILS: After creating the signature, the contacted log server
wraps the old confirmation in the chain field of the confirmation in its SyncAcknowledge
response. As a result, ILS1 receives a set of acknowledges, each consisting of a new tree
root and the associated proofs. Obviously, the last confirmation is then signed by all
ILSes that participated in the synchronization. For simplicity’s sake, we grouped the




+ request : ModificationRequest
SyncCommit
+ hash : Byte[]




+ confirmation : MultiSignature
+ consistencyProof : Proof
+ logProof : LogProof
+ mapProof : MapProof
+ root : MapRoot
+ consistencySignature : Byte[]
+ logSignature : Byte[]
+ mapSignature : Byte[]
+ rootSignature : MultiSignature
SyncResponse





Figure 3.9: The message classes used for synchronization between an arbitrary number of ILSes.
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Modification After the other ILSes completed their modifications and therefore the
synchronization, ILS1 performs the operation based on the data structures in Figure 3.10
as follows: It encapsulates the certificate with its domain in a LogEntry that serves as
label of a LogLeaf for the append-only Merkle Tree described in section 2.3. Since this
log is supposed to record modifications on the map, we additionally include the respective
Operation in each entry. On insertion, the log server recomputes all intermediate node
hashes up to the root and creates a new LogRoot instance for the incremented tree size.
Afterwards, the corresponding map leaf can be changed. However, we could get into
trouble here: As for example Application and Audit Certificates share the same domain,
we recommend using a separate log-backed map for each of the certificate types to avoid
unexpected domain collisions. As a consequence, this involves that CAs store the tree
roots for each of them. Assuming that we evaded colliding domains, the ILS can create an
Entry for the map which again consists of the domain and a certificate – in contrast to a
LogEntry, the latter may be the empty constant ε instead of the certificate upon deletion.
Using this as label, it builds a Leaf that is added to the Sparse Merkle Tree. Its index (i.e.
the associated key) is simply the digest of the certificate domain. Then, the root hash can
be calculated and combined with the LogRoot in a new MapRoot revision.
LogRoot

































Figure 3.10: Data structures provided by a log-backed map for verifying inclusion and consistency.
Proof Generation Finally, ILS1 can construct the Proof instances for verifying consis-
tency between the last and current LogRoot, as well as inclusion of the certificate in both
the log and map. Based on the findings in section 2.3, we know that a consistency proof is
a sequence of digests that prove the existence of a known former root in the tree, while
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inclusion proofs additionally include the index of a leaf. However, remember that we aim
at passing on the proof of inclusion of an entry in the map to the client as well. Hence, a
MapProof contains the whole leaf instead of just the index if it exists – as stated in the
last chapter, we have to distinguish between empty and non-existent leaves, which is why
they could be absent from the proof in the latter case. Nevertheless, the proof structure
remains the same for the underlying log: Extension is proven by a Proof instance, whereas
a LogProof allows to verify the existence of an entry.
For its final ModificationResponse (see Figure 3.8), the ILS signs each of the proofs
and the new MapRoot, as the synchronization acknowledgments of other ILSes are al-
ready signed by them. Further, it includes their final confirmation (or only the initial
acceptanceConfirmation if there were no ILSes to synchronize with) and embeds the
root signature in a MultiSignature to guarantee that a malicious CA cannot fake the
root and proofs, because such signatures have to be verified and signed by all CAs. Instead
of responding back to CA1, the response is sent to the next authority in the corresponding
certificate field, indicated by step (4) in Figure 3.6.
Verification Now it is time for CA2 to check the actions of the previous participants.
First, it performs the same steps as CA1, except that it examines the response from
ILS1. This implies that each signature in the response has to be verified - especially every
MultiSignature recursively. Second, it builds the LogLeaf that is expected from the
modification and verifies the proofs for each ILS: After ascertaining that the claimed new
root is indeed an extension of the one already stored by the CA, the leaf is used for ensuring
that the requested operation has been executed and the correct entries are included in the
log-backed map. On success, it saves the new root for future use and approves the request
by singing and therefore extending each MultiSignature just like the ILSes described
above. Then, it forwards the updated ModificationRespone to the next CA (which can
actually be CA1 if only two authorities are listed in the certificate).
Since the next CAs in the ring topology behave exactly like CA2, they verify the actions
of their predecessors. After CA1 approved, it can remove the request from its queue and
respond to the publisher with the final ModificationResponse, represented by step (5) in
our communication flow. As both the root and confirmation are signed by each participant,
the requester knows that the modified entry matches the requested modification and the
proofs are authentic - by verifying them, they can be sure that the process has been
executed correctly.
However, we have omitted one detail here: The publisher needs an already saved root
for consistency verification – unfortunately, this must be the same as the previous revision
of the ILS, because the corresponding proof only guarantees consistency between the last
and current root. A closer look reveals that this even applies to CAs: If some of them have
not participated in a modification, they cannot verify that their version and the provided
new root are consistent. Of course, CA1 could ask every CA listed in the certificate field
for their current revision and forward them to the ILS in step (2), so that a proof for each
of them can be included in the response (4). Nevertheless, we are optimistic: While we
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suggested above for security reasons to list as many CAs as available in a certificate, we
renew this recommendation at this point to need as few requests as possible. If just a very
small number of them is not involved in most modifications, then a large majority of them
will hold the current root afterwards. Therefore, only the CAs that have not participated
need to ask for it during the next run – obviously, in the worst case, this results in the
same amount of requests as the prior collection of all revisions – if our suggestion bears
fruit, there will be far fewer. Thus, when receiving a ModificationResponse, each CA
holding an older root sends a RootRequest depicted in Figure 3.11 for the type of the
modified certificate to obtain the last version before the modification and a consistency
proof from the ils. Just like for the hashes exchanged during ILS synchronization, there is
no additional signature required for the root and proof, since the overall message signature
suffices in direct communication. After verifying the proof and updating its root, the CA
can continue with the protocol steps - checking correct execution of the operations that led
to this revision is not necessary because the cas listed in the response have supervised the




+ ils : String
+ oldRevision : Integer











+ consistencyProof : Proof
+ root : MapRoot
+ cas : String[]
+ request
1
Figure 3.11: The RootRequest and RootResponse messages to verify and update to a new root.
In summary, these are quite a lot of steps to publish or delete a certificate. To illustrate
the steps and to avoid confusion, a sequence diagram for Log Modification can be found
in Appendix A. We consider a publisher pub with public key P that wants to register a
certificate with n CAs with keys C1...n and m ILSes with keys I1...m. For simplicity, we
denote the validation of process related certificate attributes as verifyParties and the
verification of participant signatures as verifySignatures. Further, we omit verification
steps of message signatures as well as decryption. On that basis, Appendix B also includes
a sequence diagram showing the following resource verification process initiated by a client
clt with public key K.
3.4.3 Resource Verification
After the publisher generated and registered an Application Certificate, they must pass the
fingerprint on to the client. This is rather simple: they sign the acceptanceConfirmation
received from CA1 and append the result together with the lists of CAs and ILSes to the
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index HTML document of their application. If an auditor has already created an Audit
Certificate for the application, the client must also be informed. Therefore, the publisher
requests the signed acceptanceConfirmation that the auditor received on registration
using a SignatureRequest (see Figure 3.12) shown by step (6) in Figure 3.6. The response





+ applicationUrl : String




+ acceptanceConfirmation : MultiSignature
+ cas : String[]
+ ilses : String[]
+ request
1
Figure 3.12: The SignatureRequest and SignatureResponse message classes to query the signed
confirmation of an AuditCertificate.
Proof Retrieval After retrieving the web application files by a common HTTP request
in step (7), the client starts with querying the appropriate Application Certificate from
the given CAs. For their GetRequest depicted in Figure 3.13, they randomly select an ILS
from the list provided by the publisher (coincidentally, it is ILS1) or, if they want to, all of
them in a row. Then, they contact the first CA in the sequence (8) – it is the same as the
one contacted for registration, namely CA1.
The CA stores the request in a queue and forwards it directly to the ILS. From now on,
we benefit greatly from the heavy verification during log modification. As mentioned in
section 3.2, the client usually only checks the inclusion of a certificate in the map, which is
sufficient since the CAs have already taken care of consistency and traceability by verifying
the modification process. Therefore, ILS1 generates only one proof of presence or absence,
depending on whether a certificate is currently registered or not. In the former case, it
must additionally verify that the CAs specified in the request and in the certificate match.
If not, this is an indication of an attack, as is the latter case with a non-existent certificate.
Afterwards, the ILS signs both the proof and the current root and sends them all in a
GetResponse to CA2, because all authorities involved in the registration must also verify
the result.
This is also straightforward: Each CA verifies the signatures in the response and simply
compares the stored root to the received one. If they are equal, the certificate must be
valid because the current root has already been verified during modification. Note that we
do not have to verify any proof here – fortunately, since we would need the log inclusion
and consistency proof to verify anything at all. If the roots differ, the CA updates its copy
using a RootRequest, which only requires consistency to be proven. Since we assume that
nearly all CAs are involved in most modifications, such requests are not only rare, they
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also remain small in size as the last observed revision will not be too long ago on average.
Thus, the actual verification of the GetResponse will be quite fast. After signing each
MultiSignature, the response is passed on to the next CA in the ring and finally to the
client (9).
Note that the request contains a type attribute. In fact, this procedure applies to any
certificate type and is hence used by CAs as well: When validating domain attributes
during certificate generation, they have to ensure that the version is an increment of the
already registered certificate, or that the specified Publisher Certificate is indeed the one
included in the current map. Therefore, they make use of the described method for proof




+ type : CertificateType
+ domain : String
+ cas : String[]




+ cert : Certificate [0..1]
+ proof : MapProof
+ root : MapRoot




Figure 3.13: The GetRequest and GetResponse messages to obtain a certificate.
Verification Upon receiving the response, the client verifies the included signatures first.
Subsequently, the certificate is cross-validated by verifying the acceptanceConfirmation
using the publisher’s public key contained in the certificate and the built-in keys of the
participating ILS and CAs. Finally, they verify the map inclusion proof to ensure that
the certificate indeed exists under the root that has been considered valid and therefore
signed by all participants. After validating the certificate attributes, the only thing left
to do is compare the resource hashes with those calculated from the downloaded files – if
successful, the client can securely trust the participants that the resources have not been
altered for a targeted attack (assuming that at least one party has not been compromised).
The procedure must only be executed when the client initially accesses the application
since a certificate can stay valid until the session ends. Nevertheless, keep in mind to verify
resources that are downloaded during runtime when implementing the protocol.
To provide a higher level of security, we included Audit Certificates. To obtain the
associated one, the client performs the same steps for proof retrieval and verification as
described before, with the difference that this time, it is based on the auditor’s fingerprint
included in the HTML index file. Thereafter, one can trust the security properties stated
in the certificate and specified assertions can be verified (continuously, if required).
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3.4.4 Monitoring
Like in ARPKI, we rely on monitors to verify global consistency among all ILSes. Unfor-
tunately, neither ARPKI, nor any of the other reviewed PKIs using log servers provide
a description of how monitoring works. Obviously, we need the log entries of each ILS
to reconstruct its map – ideally without having to build or even store both Merke Trees.
Nevertheless, we would like to incrementally verify new changes. While the former require-
ment reduces the necessary storage space, the latter decreases the size of network messages.
However, the less we store, the more we have to ask for – still, we only persist minimal
information per ILS (i.e., only the current root) and accept larger responses. Since we
assume that dedicated monitor servers execute the process quite regularly to verify global
consistency, and that clients are mostly willing to monitor a particular ILS instead of all
at once, the response messages should remain of acceptable size.
Effectively, the monitoring request process is similar to the proof retrieval procedure
described in the last section. The participating CAs only agree on the root given in the
response and verify the included signatures. Therefore, the remainder of this section skips
these steps and focuses on the message structures and the verification by a monitoring
party. A MonitorRequest illustrated in Figure 3.14 contains the same attributes as a
GetRequest in addition to the root revision that the monitor has stored and currently
trusts. The ILS includes a sequence of all new leaves of the append-only Merkle Tree that
have been added since this version in the MonitorResponse. For verification purposes,





+ type : CertificateType
+ domain : String
+ cas : String[]
+ ils : String




+ root : MapRoot
+ consistencyProof: Proof
+ leaves : LogLeaf[]
+ logProofs : LogProof[]
+ mapProofs : MapProof[]
+ consistencySignature : Byte[]
+ leavesSignature : Byte[]
+ logSignature : Byte[]




Figure 3.14: The MonitorRequest and MonitorResponse message classes for verifying correct
operation execution and (global) consistency.
After verifying each signature in the response, a monitor checks the consistency between
its current root and the one provided by the ILS. Subsequently, it starts to verify the
log inclusions. Here we face a problem: proofs of inclusion guarantee that each entry
we received is included – however, in general there could exist more new leaves about
which we have not been informed. Hence, we extend the verification of inclusion proofs by
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iteratively calculating the tree root before the insertion of a leaf. As the response contains
the leaves in order, we start by “removing” each entry from the end of the list. If the
ILS actually sent us all the new leaves, the computed root hash should equal the stored
root that is already trusted. According to [110], we could in fact remove an arbitrary
number of entries from a tree of size N and use the inclusion proof (p, [b1, . . . , bk]) of the
remaining leaf bp with highest index p to compute the root hash of a tree Mp with equal
size: Since bp must be the most-right node in Mp due to the structure of an append-only
Merkle Tree, any right sibling of bp or its ancestors that is included in [b1, . . . , bk] must
be ignored. Moreover, the nodes labeled by the remaining digests themselves are roots of
perfect subtrees in the current tree by definition, and therefore must have already been
perfect in Mp as they have an index smaller than p. Thus, we prune the inclusion proof by
prune(path(p,N), [b1, . . . , bk]) which is defined as
prune(ε, []) = []
prune(ρ · left, [b1, b2, . . . , bk]) = prune(ρ, [b2, . . . , bk])
prune(ρ · right, [b1, b2, . . . , bk]) = b1 :: prune(ρ, [b2, . . . , bk])
where :: and path denote the same operations as in section 2.3.3. As a result, we obtain
the ordered left siblings of the rightmost node bp and its ancestors in Mp, which obviously
form the inclusion proof. This implies that we can compute the root hash of Mp by
Hchain(path(p, p), bp, prune(path(p,N), [b1, . . . , bk])) .
By recursively pruning the tree by one entry, a monitor can eventually ensure that the
received root is derived from the trusted one by exactly the given leaves – of course, the
original inclusion proofs still have to be verified.
Based on the verified modifications described by the log leaves, one can build a snapshot
of the map section that results from them. After verifying the map inclusion proofs in the
response, the monitor checks that this snapshot contains only the entries specified in those.
Then, all operations that have taken place since the last call of this procedure and their
results are verified – since we store the new trusted root, we reduce the response size and
proof effort due to incrementally verifying all operations. However, a monitor only gains
knowledge about the changed certificates in each run. Therefore, we recommend that a
monitor stores the map entries locally. For dedicated monitoring servers, this helps in
checking global consistency: the certificate maps of the ILSes must remain in a consistent
state, i.e. a specific certificate may be present or absent among all of them, but an older
version is never still present in any. Further, the maps can be merged and provided to other
parties. For clients, this could enable an extended caching mechanism for certificates – if
the browser periodically monitors at least some ILSes which, for example, hold certificates
for applications that the client frequently uses, it could persist some of the entries as
they remain valid until the MonitorResponse contains a new certificate for their domains.
While this may cause computational overhead compared to the resource verification process
described before, it could preserve client history privacy since no CA or ILS can gather
knowledge about the particular domains a client visits.
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3.5 Security Analysis
Since our goal was to design a security system, we will now analyze it in terms of security.
But before, we should clarify what can be assumed in addition to the conditions we declared
in section 3.4. First, we demand that our client is able to intercept any incoming and
outgoing connection, as otherwise, neither lazily downloaded resources could be hashed, nor
assertions claimed in Audit Certificates could be verified if they target network requests.
Second, we expect each honest participant to adhere closely to our protocol – this also
requires that it has been implemented correctly without vulnerabilities and includes a
correct implementation of the log-backed map maintained by the ILS. Last but not least, we
assume that all parties are informed if misbehavior is detected. As before, the introduced
adversary model defines the abilities of an attacker.
Since we rely on the use of a collision-resistant hash function for computing resource
hashes, we limit the attack scope to faking certificate information, as the client and their
browser are not compromised according to the model. Given our attributes from section 3.1,
we thus focus on attack prevention and visibility, for which legitimization is a requirement
and tamper protection an implication. This results in two categories of adversaries: An
external attacker has access to the network communication and can read or modify it.
However, they are not a real participant of our infrastructure. In contrast, we consider an
infiltrator as internal attacker, since they have knowledge about the private key of at least
one participant. Of course, a party that is malicious in itself also belongs in this category.
According to our assumptions, the former allows Man-in-the-Middle and Denial-of-Service
attacks on participating entities, while the latter makes it possible to circumvent protocol
steps or to actively alter content, so that targeted attacks are much more difficult to
prevent. Note that we exclude replay attacks from both categories: Due to the nonce
included in each request, neither an external adversary, nor an internal attacker is able to
reuse previous responses, since they must contain a signature of the number from every
participant. Moreover, we consider timed-release attacks as a subset of attacks based on
invalid certificates because they are characterized by an illegal validity attribute with
respect to the expectedLifetime of a certificate. Thus, we only take into account their
superset and will not mention them further in the remainder of this section.
3.5.1 External Attacks
As mentioned above, the public keys of CAs and ILSes are known to publishers, audi-
tors, monitors and clients. Therefore, we call the former static entities, while the latter
are dynamic entities as they all are end users of services the core infrastructure pro-
vides. Since we expect digital signatures to be existentially unforgeable, the sender of a
ModificationRequest can be reliably identified and the recipient can verify its integrity:
if the sender is a static entity, its key is known in advance, while the public key of a
dynamic entity authorized for modification is located in a signed Publisher Certificate
within the request. Further, the message is securely encrypted with the recipient’s public
key. Thus, the communication between static entities, as well as between a static and
a dynamic participant is secure against traditional MitM attacks. Regarding messages
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between dynamic entities, this is not the case – if an adversary intercepts a request, they can
fake the response content any way they want. Nevertheless, they cannot attack the client:
Consider the SignatureRequest and its response between a publisher and an auditor. The
adversary blocks the request and responds with a bogus fingerprint. Then, the publisher
queries the inclusion proof of the corresponding Audit Certificate, which reveals the attack
if such a certificate has not been registered previously. However, if a certificate exists, we
assume that at least one attribute contains invalid content, for example an unfulfillable
assertion. After the publisher validated the attributes and figured out which is incorrect
(we assume that they know the security properties of his application), they even know
the attacker’s identity, since the adversary must own a registered Publisher Certificate to
register an Audit Certificate. Obviously, the verification and validation can likewise be
performed by the client, and the same reasoning also applies to the communication between
publisher and client, since modified confirmations included in the HTML document are
equivalent to faked fingerprints. In case of removed static entities provided together with
the MultiSignature (additional ones do not weaken security), the signature check itself
already fails.
The other type of attack we have identified is not aimed at disguise, but rather at
disruption through tons of requests collapsing a server. However, there is no point in
attacking the publisher’s web server with the intent of actually attacking the client. Since
an auditor is only involved by providing a fingerprint for their certificate, unavailability
would only result in assertions that are not verified while resource integrity could still
be ensured. Hence, we focus on static entities which provide critical functionality. First,
remember that we require every CA to protect itself against DoS attacks. Under this
assumption, one up to all ILSes can collapse under heavy load, whereby only the last case
is interesting: the client randomly queries an ILS out of the list provided by the publisher,
and retries this with another log server if it is unavailable. What remains is to specify the
client’s behavior if requests to all static entities (given along with the fingerprint) fail, as
one CA that is not available results in the same as if all static entities deny service due to
the ring topology they form when processing a request. The answer is simple: We cannot
consider the application secure because we have nothing to prove it with. However, if the
assumption holds such that all CAs and at least one ILS can protect themselves against
DoS attacks, the infrastructure remains intact.
Apparently, our architecture protects against external adversities. Nevertheless, the
analysis has not yet taken into account the fact that we may well have malicious or at least
infiltrated participants. If we involve them in our considerations, the investigated attacks
could result in dangerous combinations. But let us keep in line and have a look at how
compromised parties affect the security of our system.
3.5.2 Internal Attacks
Due to the number of different participants and their duties, it becomes a challenging task
to identify a compromised entity and prevent it from executing or enabling a successful
attack. To cope with complexity, we only consider the parties necessary for satisfying
our core security property. These are, besides the client, the different CAs and ILSes
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that are listed in the corresponding certificate fields, as well as the publisher. Further, we
split the protocol in its three main parts generation, modification and verification. We
omit monitors here because they are not an integral part of detecting altered resources –
nevertheless, since monitoring equals proof retrieval to a great extent, our analysis covers
the security of this procedure.
Generation In case of only a malicious publisher, we can quickly deal with the first
protocol step, as there are two possibilities: A bogus Publisher Certificate can contain
invalid values like a wrong unique name or domains that the publisher does not own.
However, these are identified by the CAs through manual validation. Therefore, we focus
on the second one: Since most attributes of an Application Certificate are also validated
by CAs, only the resources collection can be used for an attack. Yet, there is no way to
force a targeted one on a single client, as the certificate has to be registered in order to
obtain a fingerprint that is signed by all static entities. Thus, the altered resource files
must be delivered to anyone accessing the application which in turn means that it can
be checked by security analysts. The attacker could be identified and blamed without a
doubt, and we expect them not to want that.
If one or more CAs are compromised but not the publisher, it is possible that the certificate
could not be signed correctly. As this is verified by the publisher, they immediately detect
the misbehavior and can identify the CA. The worst case, however, is when all CAs have
been infiltrated and a third party certificate is issued for a domain that actually belongs to
the publisher. Since this has to be registered to attack the client, the legitimate domain
owner can query the ILS that stored the certificate in an accountable manner and detects
the trespass of CAs and the third party.
Next, we proceed with the combination: Consider a malicious publisher and that all
involved CAs are compromised because otherwise, at least one CA would still detect the
invalid attributes. Then, a bogus certificate can be generated, and we expect the resources
or the public key to be faked, as an invalid domain or subject name can be detected by the
actual owner. This allows a third party to impersonate the publisher’s identity, but still
results in a publicly available registered entry – like the cases before, there is only a chance
for the adversary if they bypass the modification or verification procedure.
Modification The participants that are actively involved in the modification process
are static entities, so we start off by examining the impact of a compromised CA in the
Initialization stage. Apart from being able to skip the validation steps, it could also simply
not forward the request – even if the publisher did not verify the response, the client would
at the latest notice that the required signatures are missing or the provided lists of CAs
and ILSes are outside the permitted ranges. Note that the CA itself cannot alter or fake
the certificate, as it must always be signed by the publisher, and even the message has
to contain their signature. Therefore, we also take into account the Verification stage of
the process and consider multiple malicious CAs. If we assume that the ILS is honest and
sends a valid ModificationResponse, there are not many options: refusing to sign the
MultiSignatures or interrupting the whole chain causes a verification error or a timeout
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at the subsequent CAs (which can then obviously identify the dishonest party). Even
if they are all compromised, the result is the same as if the first CA didn’t forward the
request.
Hence, we should first take a look at the effects of a malicious ILS and assume all CAs
are honest for now. Theoretically, an adversary could force our system to forward a bogus
certificate: imagine that faking a GetResponse sent to CAs would be possible, the ILS
could receive such a certificate although, for example, the required Publisher Certificate
is not registered. Let us put this aside and assume a valid certificate in the following,
since we discuss the precondition in the next paragraph. Of course, the log server could
simply create a fake certificate by itself – however, the CAs would not sign the resulting
acceptanceConfirmation due to an invalid (because non-existent) request. Either way,
the ILS obviously skips its own Validation phase. Note that it cannot modify or fake
an honest SyncAcknowledge by another log server without knowledge of its private key.
The only possible misbehavior regarding Synchronization is therefore to lie about the
actual modification: If the malicious ILS receives a SyncRequest, it can copy the current
Merkle Trees, modify the copy according to the request, respond with a valid acknowledge
containing the proofs of the copied trees and discard them once the procedure is over.
While registering a different bogus certificate is detected by the verifying entities in the
next process stages, pretending to correctly modify results in a wrong root hash that is
stored by the CAs. Due to the collision-resistant hash function, the proofs cannot be
faked and the digest must be valid to be accepted. Afterwards, the misbehavior of the ILS
becomes obvious with the next request, as the roots differ and cannot be proven to be
consistent through a RootRequest. Fortunately, this explanation also covers Modification
and Proof Generation, since these include the same actions as Synchronization.
Moving on to the combination of different malicious static entities, we know from
the analysis so far that for a successful attack, an adversary needs to infiltrate the
ILS and prevent it from validating a bogus certificate while forcing it to create a valid
acceptanceConfirmation. Further, all CAs listed in the certificate must be compromised,
so that they also skip the validation (and maybe even the verification) and sign the
MultiSignature received from the ILS. Of course, this is already required for generation
since they are responsible for signing the faked certificate. Together, they are able to
modify entries without a security alert – however, they still need to convince the client.
Before we continue with investigating the conditions that must be fulfilled to deceive
the client, we want to stress that, fortunately, the requirements for the described attack
scenario conform with the security property of ARPKI. In fact, the system parameter
n that we referenced in section 2.2.4 denotes the minimum number of CAs and ILSes
respectively required to register and to store the certificate. While we only mentioned
that one ILS must be compromised, we can easily generalize our considerations: Imagine
that the system requires a fixed number of ILSes to sign a certificate. Then, the client
would discard the bogus certificate since it is only signed by the malicious log server - thus,
the adversary has to conquer and synchronize as much ILSes as the system parameter
demands.
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Verification Although we have already figured out that compromising all CAs and
at least one ILS to successfully attack the core of our infrastructure, we should not let
ourselves be disoriented and proceed step by step. We still cannot be sure that this
always affects the client, and must examine that not even less is necessary for a successful
attack. Consequently, we assume that only the publisher is malicious, but there is a valid
certificate registered. Since the signature verification fails if the publisher provides a faked
acceptanceConfirmation, they could at most omit the fingerprint completely. But then,
the client considers the application not secure by default. Hence, the publisher could only
launch an attack by publicly registering a certificate for the altered resources which can be
detected and makes them accountable.
If the publisher is honest, but one or more CAs are not, they could only refuse to
forward the GetRequest or GetResponse, respectively. After the client notified the domain
owner and other parties, the misbehaving CA can be identified. If we instead assume
that the ILS is compromised but not the CAs, it could either respond directly with a
bogus certificate, or create a copy of the map by removing or replacing the requested one.
Even if the fake certificate is signed by CAs, both would immediately be detected: the
former due to an invalid inclusion proof, the latter due to a different root hash. Note
that the consistency proof of a RootResponse alone is not enough, but since the CAs that
authorized the last change must be listed, they can be queried for a confirmation. Based
on the identified attack scenario, we can omit these queries if the intersection of the cas in
both the RootResponse and GetRequest contains more than caMin certificate authorities.
In summary, this means that a malicious ILS cannot fake a GetResponse, which therefore
makes it impossible to force CAs to forward a bogus certificate for modification.
Finally we can pick up where we left off in the paragraph about modification. If we expect
all static entities involved in the GetRequest to be compromised, they can obviously serve
a bogus certificate or affirm that none exists. Nevertheless, once the client compares it to
the fingerprint they received from an honest publisher, the attack and the conspirators are
detected – therefore, also a malicious publisher is required to successfully inspire confidence.
However, the ILS has to copy the tree as described and the CAs have to keep the roots
of the original trees to maintain pretence. Otherwise, a monitor could detect the attack
afterwards. This implies a chance for the client: If they trust one or more dedicated
monitors, they can look up an “external” view when receiving a certificate, which forces
the adversary to compromise them as well.
3.5.3 Combined Attacks
To conclude this section, we reconsider the possible external attacks that we already
discussed together with the assumption that one or more participants are compromised.
Our results are still valid for most scenarios, except for the only internal attack scenario
we found: Although we stated that, for a successful attack, both the static entities and
the publisher must be malicious, a MitM attack by a third party on an honest publisher
suffices to pass a faked fingerprint to the client. Since the bogus third-party certificate is
not necessarily registered, neither the publisher nor monitors are able to detect the attack.
Furthermore, assume that a previous version of a certificate was issued for a vulnerable
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application, but has already been updated to a secure version. For security reasons, both
have been stored on multiple ILSes. Now, the adversary wants to deliver the old application
to exploit the known vulnerabilities. If they control the publisher, CAs but only one ILS,
they are able to behave well towards other parties and to provide the fingerprint of the
old certificate to the client. Nevertheless, they must rely on chance that the client chooses
exactly the compromised log server to query the certificate. However, this choice can be
forced: If the remaining ILS cannot respond because of DoS attacks, the client always
requests the last one left.
Since the former scenario based on a MitM attack targets the publisher, our level
of security is unfortunately not higher than that of ARPKI, but at least cannot drop
below it. This also applies to the latter, as ARPKI does not include more than one ILS
in their proof responses, and is reflected by the comparison of the three categories in
Table 3.1.Nevertheless, a resource alteration attack through our architecture requires more
extensive and sophisticated actions if additional common security mechanisms are applied.
In section 3.7, we discuss how security can be further improved.
External Internal Combined
Generation Modification Verification
Publisher × 1 0 1 0
CA × c c c c
ILS × × i i 1
Table 3.1: Entities that must be controlled for a successful attack on the client, out of one
publisher, c CAs and i ILSes that are listed in the certificate.
3.6 Implementation
We provide a prototypical implementation of each participant and a small application to
demonstrate the protocol on GitHub1. All components are written in TypeScript, and all
but the client host a Node.js server. During their implementation, we have taken care to
meet our quality attributes: since we wanted to enable simple deployment, the entities
have been virtualized using Docker2 containers and can therefore be configured using a few
environment variables.
Of course, the client implementation is not wrapped in a container – it is currently
delivered within an extension for Google’s browser Chrome. Multiple extension APIs
make it possible to query the content of resources for multiple frames at each tab update
and incoming request. Further, the DOM and therefore the included fingerprint together
with the CAs and ILSes can be obtained, which in turn allows to request the certificate
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compared, a pop-up icon that displays the current process stage enables the user to view
detailed certificate information. Currently, only a simple assertion for the absence of eval
calls is implemented for demonstration – however, any assertion is continuously validated
as long as a certificate stays valid (i.e. throughout the tab session).
For the Merkle Trees of the ILS we use Trillian [110], a reference implementation of the
verifiable data structures described in [90], because it supports Sparse Merkle Trees in map
mode and append-only Merkle Trees as log. Thus, the desired log-backed maps for each
certificate type can be composed by multiple tree instances that are maintained by the ILS.
It is implemented as a gRPC3 service and provides a rich interface definition in Protocol
Buffers4 that can easily be compiled to TypeScript. In log mode, a dedicated component
periodically fetches a batch of queued leafs and appends them to the tree. While this may
cause a significant delay for only a few insertions, it scales to handle a huge amount of
requests. Unfortunately, only the tree service is provided as Docker container, and we had
to imlpement client functionality such as verification in TypeScript by hand.
Finally, we use the most probably collision-resistant [39] hash functions SHA-256 for the
calculation of resource digests and SHA-512/256 for the log-backed map, while RSA-2048
serves for digital signatures.
Deployment Aspects Note that also the publishers and auditors host a server for
protocol handling in a container. We expect publishers to run this component on their
build server, as this allows the protocol to be performed elegantly: After the build process
of the application has finished, a one-line command suffices to execute a thin publish script
(which we provide in TypeScript, but can easily be adopted for other languages) which reads
a static configuration file containing the process related certificate attributes, computes
the resource hashes and contacts the server component to execute the modification process
with the received information. Then, the server looks up the Publisher Certificate in its
local database. If there is none, the generation procedure is initiated. Otherwise, the
final Application Certificate is constructed, sent to the CAs to obtain their signatures and
finally forwarded to the first CA for modification. On success, the script automatically
includes the MultiSignature together with the lists of CAs and ILSes in the specified
index HTML file. If the application has been audited, it queries the auditor server and
adds the resulting fingerprint in the same way. The auditor component has to execute
similar steps to publish a certificate that are also initiated by a simple script, but should
be always available for publisher requests. Nevertheless, the automated use of both the
auditor and publisher components together with the easy configuration and setup due to
virtualization satisfy the key aspect of our deployment requirement.
Application The demonstration scenario is about a publisher who wants to register
their certificate with two CAs and one ILS. Therefore, each participant is visibly launched
in a separate shell, and especially the publisher provides detailed explanations to the user.





the hashed password on action) and registered the corresponding Application Certificate,
the user can access the website in a browser with installed the extension. Further, the user
can advise the publisher to alter the page resources such that the password is transferred
in plain-text – then, the extension should indicate an attack. Alternatively, the publisher
can contact an auditor to “audit” the application and register an Audit Certificate which
is afterwards also visible in the extension pop-up and allows to automatically verify the
assertion mentioned above.
3.7 Discussion
Our analysis in section 3.5 has already shown that the proposed architecture requires
at least as many participants to be compromised as ARPKI for a successful attack. If
we assume a secure connection between publisher and client, the former must also have
malicious intentions. Finally, in contrast to other PKIs, the required level of compromise
can be adjusted to the number of participants due to configurable policies like in ARPKI.
However, we have neither discussed if and how our system could be improved with respect
to the other characteristics that we compared in section 2.2.4, nor have we taken into
account economic considerations for practical use.
History Privacy In terms of the compared features, our architecture is mainly consistent
with ARPKI. We provide effective attack prevention, means for revoking certificates or
updating them in case of key loss and prohibit multiple certificates for a domain. Neverthe-
less, there are some differences: While this work lacks a formal proof, it extends ARPKI
by a more sophisticated authenticated data structure that supports proving of consistency
between multiple versions. Further, we require extra client communication to query the
ILS, which is not necessary in ARPKI since they trust the publisher. Unfortunately, we
leak the client’s browsing history through this connection. The log server is able to learn
the registered applications that the client visits – although we do not regard it as relevant
to achieving our goal, this weakness can easily be overcome: Instead of requesting the full
domain, a GetRequest could include only a hash prefix of it. This corresponds to an inner
node of the Sparse Merkle Tree and therefore results in multiple possible leaves which are
sent back to the client. Depending on the number of certificates stored, the prefix length
could be adjusted so that generally the same number of possible certificates is returned
and the ILS cannot identify the actual domain.
Economic Incentives Another vulnerability we already mentioned and which also exists
in ARPKI is the possibility of split-view attacks: while several compromised parties could
work together to present modified copies of the log and map, our protocol even allows
a publisher to register more than one certificate for an application by using two disjoint
subsets of both CAs and ILSes. So far, we have tolerated this weakness because of expansion
considerations – however, it could be avoided by always synchronizing modifications between
all existing ILSes without a choice. The system could still be extended by new log servers or
authorities, but would require each certificate to be updated. Nevertheless, there is another
57
3 Certificate-based Resource Alteration Prevention
reason for our decision to not include all ILSes and CAs by default: Operating an authority
or a log is expensive. Since we rely on multiple of them to guarantee security, we want
to offer incentives for potential commercial service providers. Because publishers usually
have a great interest in assuring the client that the application has not been tampered
with, they would be likely to pay if they want to include more than one ILS or caMin
CAs to achieve a higher level of robustness and security. Note that this also implies that
the minimal configuration could still be free of charge and in turn an encouragement for
domain owners to register at all.
Gossip Protocols Returning to the split-view attack vulnerability, we pointed out that
monitors are able to detect such attacks. However, a client would have to trust them –
since they must be highly available and can therefore be easily attacked, this is rather
undesirable. As assumed in DTKI, gossip protocols [111] can be integrated in our system
to let clients communicate about their view of an ILS. This could be realized without any
additional infrastructure or requests [112]: By piggybacking the MapRoot on top of the
requests and responses in our protocol, misbehavior can be detected with high probability
if a quorum of both clients and CAs or ILSes gossip. Although we did not implement
a gossip mechanism as part of this work, it could be a trade-off between security and
profitability in a live system.
Testing A well-known testing technique for web applications are A/B tests [113]: by
presenting a modified version of the application with the feature to be tested to a factor
of all users, while the rest of them receive the actual current version, one can evaluate
the acceptance and impact of the feature with regard to the metrics used. Obviously, this
might be critical in terms of security, especially since it allows a publisher to almost drown
clients in an arbitrary number of versions that have not been reviewed. For this reason, we
decided to allow only one certificate per application domain – while we generally consider
such techniques inadequate for security-critical systems, the publisher can still use them
by redirecting on different (sub-)domains.
Mobile Clients A fundamental difference to ARPKI is the use of a log-backed map and
the associated proofs of log inclusion and consistency. It might be that CAs and monitors
would be able to provide enough storage space and computational power to maintain their
own Merkle Trees, which in turn would allow them to verify actions of an ILS without
further proofs. However, clients must be able to verify inclusion as well, and ideally even
consistency if enough resources are available. Assuming the case that it is a mobile client,
we can benefit from common browser technology that shares the basis with desktop systems,
but have to cope with limited resources and computing power. Hence, the log-backed map
with additional proofs, but of fixed size, is much more suitable for these devices because we
exchange a whole tree to be maintained for some hash calculations – however, remember
that monitoring (which proves consistency and operation correctness) remains optional to
avoid unnecessarily burdening the client’s connection.
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This work contributes to protecting the privacy and confidentiality of user data by making a
novel proposal for protection against resource alteration attacks that are targeted at one or
a group of clients. With these, an adversary is able to make changes to the source code of a
single page application, possibly even with the help of its publisher, in order to gain access
to the user’s sensitive data. As a result, traditional client-side web attacks are no longer
necessary, and the approaches proposed so far do not provide sufficient protection against
them. In contrast, our system is capable of effectively protecting against such attacks, even
if the adversary has compromised a certain but scalable number of components within our
infrastructure. To provide more security to casual users of an application, we additionally
enable security experts to pass on their analysis results to the clients.
To conclude this thesis, we will give a short summary of how we designed this system
and subsequently discuss possible improvements left for future work.
4.1 Summary
The shift from static websites to JavaScript-based single page applications has enabled a
client-side attack called tampering, which was previously more ascribed to the server-side.
By manipulating resources, security mechanisms against classic client-side attacks can
be bypassed. In this work, we assume a powerful adversary who, in addition to content
distribution networks, controls the publisher of a website as well as other members of
the network that may be relevant for security systems. We call their attacks Resource
Alteration Attacks because they can legitimately make changes to the application. Further,
we consider a scenario where they attack a specific or a small group of users of a single
page application and have control over an arbitrary number of network members – but
never over all, otherwise we wouldn’t have a chance. Based on this, none of the existing
proposals against tampering can detect the attack, and certainly not protect sensitive user
data.
We propose a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that provides effective protection in this
scenario. Certificate Authorities (CA) issue certificates containing collision-resistant hash
values of application resources, which are stored by a publicly viewable append-only log
server in a verifiable manner. The CAs supervise this process as well as the actions of each
other, and approve them through digital signatures – thus, they can be held accountable in
case of inconsistencies. The client can verify inclusion of a certificate at the log server as
well as equality between the certificate resources and the ones provided by the publisher.
Furthermore, we enable security experts called Auditors to deliver analysis results to the
client in the same way, so that application vulnerabilities that lead to common client-side
attacks can easily be indicated.
To find a suitable design, we first surveyed the PKI landscape, which can be divided into
CA-centric, client-centric and domain-centric. Representatives of the former do not protect
against compromised CAs, which would be easy for the adversary to control. Client-centric
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approaches can only offer limited security, since even an honest publisher is never involved.
We therefore took a closer look at domain-centric approaches and opted for infrastructures
based on log servers, as consensus building in blockchains allows the attacker to take
control of the majority. We then compared them in terms of various security features and
the statements they can prove – most of these proposals are based on the authenticated
data structure Merkle Tree, which can generate proofs about its construction and content.
This binary hash tree, in which each node contains the concatenation of the hash values
of its children and each leaf contains the actual data, generally allows the construction
of proofs of existence for a data value. These consist of the sibling nodes of all ancestors
of the leaf, and therefore have a space requirement that is logarithmic in the number of
data present, just as the time the verification algorithm takes. If additionally, the tree is
append-only (i.e. that no elements can be deleted) one can construct a proof in a similar
way that a Merkle Tree represents an extension of another. In contrast, a Sparse Merkle
Tree (SMT) cannot prove consistency, but allows the implementation of a key-value store,
and thus adding and removing values, by introducing an empty data element. The binary
key is converted into a path to the leaf with the data element – this can be used to prove
whether a particular key-value pair is included or not. To maintain a history of the changes,
an SMT is combined with an append-only Merkle Tree in a log-backed map, where the
latter contains the modifications of the SMT.
The Integrity Log Servers (ILS) of our public key infrastructure use such log-backed maps
to store the certificates in a verifiable manner. Since the requirements for our approach
include not only security but also quality attributes such as efficiency, we chose this solution
instead of simple append-only Merkle Trees, as it allows to quickly prove presence as well
as absence of certificates and still consistency between log versions. Besides certificates for
resources and those for analyses, an ILS also holds dedicated certificates for the publisher
or auditor, so that their authenticity does not have to be checked manually by the CA
with every new version of the resource or analysis certificate – instead, this can be done
automatically by means of digital signatures.
In order to register, modify and query a certificate, we modified and extended an existing
protocol. It now consists of the following steps, which are almost completely generic
for the three certificate types: To generate a registrable certificate, the publisher of a
security-critical application first lists the CAs to be contacted, which verify the content
and sign the certificate. Then, in step two, it is transferred to one of the listed CAs, which
monitors the subsequent process. This then forwards the certificate to an ILS also specified
by the publisher, which synchronizes it with other ILSes if required and sends proof of
correct execution of the operation to the next CA in the list. This CA also checks the
content of the certificate and verifies the proofs, which it signs as approval if successful.
It also stores the root of the log-backed map, which serves as a fingerprint for all data
contained. As the signed proofs are forwarded to the other CAs and finally to the initial
one in a ring structure, the certificate authorities can monitor the process and each other
through their signatures. This quite extensive modification procedure allows a high degree
of security to be very efficiently guaranteed in the third step, the client’s request for a
certificate: As in the last step, the response of the ILS is passed through all CAs – however,
they do not have to verify the certificate proof, but only to compare the roots and, if
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they match, can directly sign and forward it. The client can then verify that everyone
accepts the root, that the received certificate is really in the log-backed map and that the
application resources received from the publisher match those in the certificate.
Furthermore, we have developed a procedure to verify global consistency and correctness
of all log-backed maps. Since the verifying entity does not have to create and maintain
Merkle Trees, this can be done by dedicated Monitors as well as by the client itself.
A security analysis of the public key infrastructure, which considers external, internal
attacks and combinations of these, revealed a scalable security level for the presentation
of a bogus certificate. While purely external attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
or Denial-of-Service (DoS), have no chance of success, even internal attacks in which one
or more entities are compromised can only remain undetected if all participating CAs
and ILSes, as well as the publisher itself, are malicious. If the adversary attacks with a
combination of MitM, DoS and compromise, they must still have control over the CAs and
at least one ILS to succeed.
After presenting basic information of our prototype implementation of all participants,
we discussed aspects that are relevant for the productive use of the system. In addition,
we pointed out economic incentives that, in addition to simple deployment, contribute to a
rapid and large-scale commissioning.
4.2 Future Work
This work lays the foundation to increase security for the user of a single page application,
as well as their confidence. Nevertheless, besides code optimization and porting, there
are further technical aspects as well as theoretical and practical questions that should be
addressed in the future.
Audit Properties From a technical point of view, we have not specified how more
complex assertions resulting from analyses, which are delivered to the client in audition
certificates, should be specified and verified. The static verification in our prototype
implementation that eval is not used can be done relatively easily – complex assertions
that rely on network monitoring or dynamic analysis, for example, require additional
conception and programming effort for our browser extension. A fundamental question
here is whether all audit properties should be verifiable by assertions and whether they
can be at all.
Formal proof From a theoretical point of view, although it’s not very common in the
area of public key infrastructures, we believe that security protocols should always be
formally verified – since Lowe’s attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol [114], it’s obvious
that informal analyses cannot suffice for more complex security protocols. Although we
strongly rely on two verified infrastructures for our protocol, there should be formal proof
before using the system. One approach could be not to rely on the Tamarin prover and
rewriting like ARPKI and DTKI, but to model the individual participants using structured
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algebraic specifications. This would make it possible to prove statements for any number
of participants instead of a few concrete instances using expressive logics.
Multi Page Applications From a practical point of view, the restriction to single
page applications that do not change URL paths excludes websites that use multiple
URLs, especially multi page applications. However, since hybrid and some single page
applications also work with different paths, it would be desirable for our system to be
able to handle them. For example, one could use regular expressions to describe the
corresponding URLs – but for validation you would have to prove that the intersection of
this language with all other registered ones is empty. For example, the complement of the
union of the complements of the corresponding finite machines could be determined for
two languages each, but this might result in considerable computational effort for many
registered certificates.
Subresource Integrity Last but not least, we would like to discuss Subresource Integrity,
which we already presented in section 1.2 as a technique against tampering. As soon as its
status changes from Recommendation to Living Standard and all browsers support it, we
can benefit by not having to list all resource hashes anymore, but only one of the index
HTML page in the certificate. All other resources together with their digests are stored in
this page and protected by Subresource Integrity.
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